Has Malaysia really escaped the resource curse? A closer look at the political economy of oil revenue management and expenditures

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 ◽  
pp. 98-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Doraisami
Energy Policy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (12) ◽  
pp. 5317-5325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivar Kolstad ◽  
Arne Wiig

2018 ◽  
pp. 004908571878613
Author(s):  
Keston K. Perry

This article criticizes the resource curse thesis for neglecting the interplay of international factors and domestic politics, the political settlement, in explaining the industrialization in Trinidad and Tobago industrial performance in a resource-dependent country. Using political settlement analysis secondary as well as interview data, it examines the dynamics at the macro and sectoral levels in iron and steel and telecommunications in Trinidad and Tobago. The historical evidence reveals that anti-colonial mobilizations spurred critical public investments in developmental institutions and industrial projects responsible for improving the country’s productive base and technological capability in the post- Black Power period. These investments were bolstered by bolstered by a favorable geopolitical climate and the 1973 commodity boom. Sectoral case studies reveal how shifts in the country’s political settlement affected late-industrializing accumulation of accumulation technological capabilities, yet neoliberal policies facilitated an increased role for external actors on economic policy and ethnic-based clientelism within the political economy.


Author(s):  
Peter M. Lewis

Petroleum has been key to Nigeria’s political economy since the 1970s, giving rise to a syndrome called the “resource curse.” This includes a revenue monoculture, procyclical policies, endemic corruption, political uncertainty, communal tensions, and heightened conflict. The resource curse concept is organized around shifting elite bargains for the mediation of state-controlled rents. Analyses of the resource curse emphasize structural continuity, yet the syndrome is not immutable, as political interests and institutions may lead to different outcomes. Nigeria’s two petroleum booms illustrate the influence of political factors. Both were framed by abrupt windfalls, volatility, and equally sudden declines in revenue. While the first boom culminated in prolonged economic decline, the second was followed by transient recession and resilient performance in the non-oil economy. This chapter argues that electoral politics and civic participation have shifted elite incentives toward more responsive policies, though these factors are insufficient to shift the political settlement toward an inclusive developmental model.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document