One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youngsub Chun
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bettina Klaus

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the previous analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Thomson (1995b) proved that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, one-sided population-monotonicity, and replication-invariance. Replacing one-sided population-monotonicity by one-sided replacement-domination yields another characterization of the uniform rule (Thomson, 1997a). Until now, the independence of replication-invariance from the other properties in these characterizations was an open problem. In this note we prove this independence by means of a single example.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renan-Ulrich Goetz ◽  
Yolanda Martínez ◽  
Jofre Rodrigo

In this paper, the introduction of three different methods for the assignment of water in agriculture is simulated in order to compare its economic efficiency for the case of an irrigated area located in the central Ebro Valley. Apart from the currently applied proportional system, water markets have been simulated along with the uniform rule, developed in social choice theory. The results show that although the water market achieves the best results in all cases, the uniform rule can be an interesting alternative to current management methods if water assignments are at regular levels, while in the case of severe water shortage; markets offer a clearer advantage with regard to any other method. The results also show that higher levels of heterogeneity between firms and high water prices situate the uniform rule in a more favorable situation then the currently applied proportional system.


1996 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gert -Jan Otten ◽  
Hans Peters ◽  
Oscar Volij

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