strategy proofness
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2021 ◽  
pp. 110164
Author(s):  
Sarvesh Bandhu ◽  
Bishwajyoti Mondal ◽  
Anup Pramanik

2021 ◽  
pp. 110083
Author(s):  
K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao ◽  
Achille Basile ◽  
Surekha Rao

Author(s):  
Steven Yin ◽  
Shatian Wang ◽  
Lingyi Zhang ◽  
Christian Kroer

Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Unlike existing settings, we allow each agent to specify requirements to only accept allocations from a subset of the total supply for each resource. These requirements can take form in location constraints (e.g. A hospital can only accept volunteers who live nearby due to commute limitations). This can also model a type of substitution effect where some agents need 1 unit of resource A \emph{or} B, both belonging to the same meta-type. But some agents specifically want A, and others specifically want B. We propose a new mechanism called Dominant Resource Fairness with Meta Types which determines the allocations by solving a small number of linear programs. The proposed method satisfies Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and a notion of sharing incentive for our setting. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study this problem formulation, which improved upon existing work by capturing more constraints that often arise in real life situations. Finally, we show numerically that our method scales better to large problems than alternative approaches.


2021 ◽  
pp. 109992
Author(s):  
K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao ◽  
Achille Basile ◽  
Surekha Rao

Author(s):  
Ryosuke Sakai ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa

AbstractWe consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.


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