Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Ehlers ◽  
Bettina Klaus ◽  
Szilvia Pápai
2019 ◽  
Vol 101 ◽  
pp. 104-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiarui Gan ◽  
Warut Suksompong ◽  
Alexandros A. Voudouris

2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barberà ◽  
Dolors Berga ◽  
Bernardo Moreno

Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 591-627
Author(s):  
Aurélie Beynier ◽  
Yann Chevaleyre ◽  
Laurent Gourvès ◽  
Ararat Harutyunyan ◽  
Julien Lesca ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
David J. Abraham ◽  
Katarína Cechlárová ◽  
David F. Manlove ◽  
Kurt Mehlhorn

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