Comparing catalysts of change: evolution and institutional differences in the venture capital industries in the U.S., Japan and Germany

Author(s):  
Walter Kuemmerle
1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 390-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott D. Gerber ◽  
Keeok Park

In this first systematic and extensive application of cross-judicial methodology, we examine the members of the Rehnquist Court (1986–94 terms) with prior appellate court experience to discern any correlation with their Supreme Court behavior in terms of nonconsensual opinion writing and voting. We find that they become less consensual as justices than they were as judges in the lower court. Importantly, this finding holds after controlling for such institutional differences between the two court levels as size, ideology, case types, stare decisis, and norms. Consistent with the neoinstitutional perspective, we surmise that this behavior change is due to the modern Supreme Court being unique, a court on which the members feel it is desirable, necessary, and possible to express policy disagreements with the majority via separate opinions and votes.


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