The Quixotic Search for Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court: A Cross-Judicial Empirical Analysis of the Rehnquist Court Justices

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 390-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott D. Gerber ◽  
Keeok Park

In this first systematic and extensive application of cross-judicial methodology, we examine the members of the Rehnquist Court (1986–94 terms) with prior appellate court experience to discern any correlation with their Supreme Court behavior in terms of nonconsensual opinion writing and voting. We find that they become less consensual as justices than they were as judges in the lower court. Importantly, this finding holds after controlling for such institutional differences between the two court levels as size, ideology, case types, stare decisis, and norms. Consistent with the neoinstitutional perspective, we surmise that this behavior change is due to the modern Supreme Court being unique, a court on which the members feel it is desirable, necessary, and possible to express policy disagreements with the majority via separate opinions and votes.

2014 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-339
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Schwartz

When the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court conclude that some law, or some decision of a lower court, violates the U.S. Constitution, no great difficulties of principle or sentiment need accompany their decision to abrogate the opinions of the earlier legislators or judges. The justices, and others, are expected to understand their decision either as correcting a mistake that had been introduced by fallible people who, with intentions good or bad, or unintentionally, had violated the system's basic rulebook, or as reflecting the fact that since the time those legislators or judges made their decisions something relevant (such as notions of “cruel and unusual punishment” or of what affects interstate commerce) had changed, so what was once constitutionally acceptable no longer is. Thus, however upsetting the substance of the justices’ decision may be, it need not imply a condemnation of their predecessors nor entail a disruption of the system's authority structures—as is seen in the fact that the justices, and American citizens, readily use such explicit verbs as “reverse,” “strike down,” or “overturned” for what the justices do


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 816-820
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez

In this first decision by the United States Supreme Court on the scope and application of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, better known as the Hague Service Convention, petitioner, a West German company, challenged the respondent’s attempt to serve process on petitioner by serving its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary in accordance with the state’s rules rather than pursuant to the procedures of the Convention. The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, found that the relationship between the German parent and the U.S. subsidiary was such that, under state-law rules of agency, the U.S. subsidiary was the parent’s involuntary agent for service of process. Because service could thus be perfected entirely within the United States, the court held that it was not necessary to follow the procedures of the Hague Service Convention. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court (per O’Connor, J.) affirmed and held: (1) the Hague Service Convention is “mandatory” and preempts inconsistent state-law methods of service in all cases to which it applies; (2) the Convention applies where there is occasion to transmit a document abroad to charge persons with formal notice of a pending action; and (3) whether it is necessary to transmit a document abroad for such purposes is determined by the forum state’s internal law.


1973 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas F. Hady

If we could get a nickel for every time the demise of the property tax has been predicted in this century, we probably could invest the proceeds and use the interest to finance a program of property tax reform. In a sense, this subject is old.In another sense, however, there is something very new about discussing alternative ways of raising money for local governments. In August 1971, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in the now well-known case of Serrano v. Priest; in March 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a similar ruling by a lower court in Texas. The Court ruled that the present system of financing local schools in California, which relies heavily on the property tax, unconstitutionally “conditions the full entitlement to such interest on wealth, classifies its recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and makes the quality of a child's education depend upon the resources of his school district and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his parents.” Since that time, more than 50 similar suits have been filed in some 31 states, and the U.S. Supreme Court is reviewing an appeal from Texas in a case similar to Serrano.


2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. 84-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon S. Vernick

The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Until recently, no federal appellate court had ever struck down any gun law as a violation of the Second Amendment. In fact, even laws outlawing most handgun possession, or restricting other types of firearms, had been upheld, in part, because the laws did not interfere with the functioning of state militias.Then, in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court — for the first time in nearly 70 years — decided a case squarely addressing the meaning of the Second Amendment. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to own handguns in the home, invalidating a Washington, D.C. law.But Heller left many issues undecided, including the precise scope of the Second Amendment.


Author(s):  
Pamela C. Corley ◽  
Artemus Ward

1989 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael W. La Morte

Lawsuits in nearly three dozen states have challenged the constitutionality of state school finance provisions on equal protection or educational adequacy grounds. Presently, the U.S. Supreme Court, a federal appellate court, and 10 state supreme courts have upheld state provisions, and 7 state supreme courts have held school financing provisions unconstitutional. Although wealth-related school finance litigation began in 1968 and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the issue in 1973, the judicial caldron continues to boil. Protracted rounds of litigation over the years in several states and a rash of recent suits reveal this issue to remain lively and contentious.


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