Humean Laws in an unHumean World

ABSTRACT:I argue that an unHumean ontology of irreducibly dispositional properties might be fruitfully combined with what has typically been thought of as a Humean account of laws, namely, the best-system account, made popular by David Lewis (e.g., 1983, 1986, 1994). In this paper I provide the details of what I argue is the most defensible account of Humean laws in an unHumean world. This package of views has the benefits of upholding scientific realism while doing without any suspect metaphysical entities to account for natural law. I conclude by arguing that the Humean laws-unHumean ontology package is well placed to provide an account of objective, nontrivial chances, a famous stumbling block for the Humean laws-Humean ontology package developed by Lewis.

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Causal Powers and Structures

Reconsidering Causal Powers ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198869528.003.0012 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 271-283

Author(s):

Brian Ellis

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

Modern Science ◽

Logical Necessity ◽

Causal Powers ◽

Metaphysical Necessity ◽

The Third ◽

Dispositional Essentialism ◽

Dispositional Properties

Brian Ellis provides a detailed and systemic overview of his version of dispositional essentialism. Ellis is famous for having developed and defended a mixed ontology for scientific realism. This is a robustly Aristotelian ontology that involves a mix of categorical and essentially dispositional properties inhering as universal in individualized entities. In this contribution, Ellis briefly defends this sort of ontology by arguing that it, or something very much like it, is necessary to provide an account of the system of reality discovered through modern science. It is, moreover, entirely adequate for the job of accounting for the ontology of modern science. He then turns to consider three objections to his ontology. The first is what other contributors will call the ‘directedness problem’, which is the idea that powers are directed at their manifestation in a way analogous to the directedness of intentionality. The second is what other contributors call the ‘intrinsicness problem’, which is the idea that causal powers are intrinsic to or inhering in their subject. The third is what other contributors call the ‘necessity problem’, which is the idea that there is something important and distinctive about metaphysical necessity vis-à-vis logical necessity.

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The Extension Defended

10.1093/oso/9780198802099.003.0006 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Daniel Stoljar

Keyword(s):

Scientific Realism ◽

David Lewis ◽

Natural Properties ◽

Total Information ◽

Lewis A

This chapter defends the argument in favour of optimism set out in Chapter 5 (OA2) by focusing on whether it operates with too low a standard for explanation. Three proposals for higher standards are considered in turn: 1) an explanation should provide what will be called ‘total information’; 2) an explanation should provide what will be called ‘reductive information’; 3) an explanation should provide what will be called ‘highly naturalistic information’. The latter concept arises from ideas about natural properties due to David Lewis. A discussion of Lewis on natural properties and their definition leads to a further discussion of scientific realism. All three proposals for higher standards are found wanting. At the end of the chapter, an assessment of the overall case for optimism set out in Chapters 3–6 is offered.

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