Asymmetry cannot solve the circularity/regress problem of property structuralism

Strong dispositional monism (SDM), the position that all fundamental physical properties consist in dispositional relations to other properties, is naturally construed as property structuralism. J. Lowe’s circularity/regress objection (CRO) constitutes a serious challenge to SDM that questions the possibility of a purely relational determination of all property essences. The supervenience thesis of A. Bird’s graph-theoretic asymmetry reply to CRO can be rigorously proved. Yet the reply fails metaphysically, because it reveals neither a metaphysical determination of identities on a purely relational basis nor a determination specifically of identities in the sense of essences. Asymmetry is thus not by itself sufficient for a solution to CRO. But it cannot even help to answer CRO when a model for the determination of essences is taken as a basis. Nor is asymmetry necessary for a reply, as property structures may well be symmetric. A metaphysics of dispositional properties as grounded in a purely relational structure faces serious obstacles, and the properties would not be fundamental. Since essence and grounding are notions of metaphysical priority, there can be no essentially dispositional metaphysically fundamental properties, and the prospects of a “coherentist” metaphysics of basic properties are dim. A modal retreat that refrains from a post-modal conception of essence and simply claims that fundamental properties play dispositional roles by metaphysical necessity is unsatisfactory.

A Refined Propensity Account for GRW Theory

Spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics turn the usual Schrödinger equation into a stochastic dynamical law. In particular, in this paper I will focus on the GRW theory. Two philosophical issues that can be raised about GRW concern (a) the ontology of the theory, in particular the nature of the wave function and its role within the theory, and (b) the interpretation of the objective probabilities involved in the dynamics of the theory. During the last years, it has been claimed that we can take advantage of dispositional properties in order to develop an ontology for GRW theory, and also in order to ground the objective probabilities which are postulated by it. However, in this paper I will argue that the dispositional interpretations which have been discussed in the literature so far are either flawed or—at best—incomplete. If we want to endorse a dispositional interpretation of GRW theory we thus need an extended account which specifies the precise nature of those properties and which makes also clear how they can correctly ground all the probabilities postulated by the theory. Thus, after having introduced several different kinds of probabilistic dispositions, I will try to fill the gap in the literature by proposing a novel and complete dispositional account of GRW, based on what I call spontaneous weighted multi-track propensities. I claim that such an account can satisfy both of our desiderata.

Causal Powers and Structures

Brian Ellis provides a detailed and systemic overview of his version of dispositional essentialism. Ellis is famous for having developed and defended a mixed ontology for scientific realism. This is a robustly Aristotelian ontology that involves a mix of categorical and essentially dispositional properties inhering as universal in individualized entities. In this contribution, Ellis briefly defends this sort of ontology by arguing that it, or something very much like it, is necessary to provide an account of the system of reality discovered through modern science. It is, moreover, entirely adequate for the job of accounting for the ontology of modern science. He then turns to consider three objections to his ontology. The first is what other contributors will call the ‘directedness problem’, which is the idea that powers are directed at their manifestation in a way analogous to the directedness of intentionality. The second is what other contributors call the ‘intrinsicness problem’, which is the idea that causal powers are intrinsic to or inhering in their subject. The third is what other contributors call the ‘necessity problem’, which is the idea that there is something important and distinctive about metaphysical necessity vis-à-vis logical necessity.

Secondary Qualities as Dispositions

In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke, secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume that secondary qualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them “powers” to produce sensations. However, primary qualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, if secondary qualities are dispositional properties, then objects would retain secondary qualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors “vanish” in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view of secondary qualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., the secondary qualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus, the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold that secondary qualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us.

Capital in the history of economic thought: charting the ontological underworld

We undertake a comprehensive descriptive and comparative ontology of capital in the history of economic thought post-1870. Beginning with the pioneering contributions of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, Clark and Knight, we reassess the familiar dualistic ontology of capital that contrasts ‘materialist’ and ‘fundist’ approaches. Advancing beyond this dualism, we find that the ontology of capital is an evolving mosaic presenting many nuances and overlapping with other ontologies concerning notions of time and atomism. There is no substitute for examining the diverse theories, causal explanations and conceptual systems in which capital is embedded. In episodic capital controversies, economists have employed distinctive metaphors of capital revealing hidden presuppositions that imply specific functional and dispositional properties of capital. Ontological comparison can uncover implicit ideas about capital, as evidenced in the metaphors used by Böhm-Bawerk, Hayek and Robinson. The benefits of a descriptive and comparative approach are further illustrated in our critical appraisal of the modern monetary ontology of capital associated with Piketty, business finance and growth accounting. Differentiated by their specific ontologies, each explanation of capital in market economies should be regarded as at best a very partial account, though our assessment shows that some explanations are relatively more fragmentary and impoverished than others.

Laws, Exceptions and Dispositions

Can laws of nature be universal regularities and nevertheless have exceptions? Several answers to this question, in particular the thesis that there are no laws outside of fundamental physics, are examined and rejected. It is suggested that one can account for exceptions by conceiving of laws as strictly universal determination relations between (instances of) properties. When a natural property is instantiated, laws of nature give rise to other, typically dispositional properties. In exceptional situations, such properties manifest themselves either in an unusual way or not at all.

Russellian physicalism and protophenomenal properties

According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Morris and Brown (Journal of Consciousness Studies 2016, 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are ‘experience specific’, that is, they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism.

Dispositions and Chance

This chapter develops a suggestion of Nelson Goodman that one should see the problem of explaining dispositional predicates and the problem of constructing an adequate theory of confirmation as aspects of the same underlying problem. It is argued that projectivism—the strategy of connecting rules of inductive practice with the development of theoretical descriptive concepts—does not imply quasi-realism, but is compatible with a thoroughly realistic understanding of those concepts. After a general discussion of the role of dispositional properties, the chapter looks in more detail at one kind of dispositional theory—a propensity account of objective chance—where the conceptual connection between concepts for giving a theoretical description of the world and rules of inductive practice is particularly explicit.

Knowledge and Conditionals

A set of interconnected chapters on topics in the theory of knowledge. Part 1 considers the concept of knowledge, its logical properties, and its relation to belief and partial belief, or credence. It includes a discussion of belief revision, two discussions of reflection principles, a chapter about the status of self-locating knowledge and belief, a chapter about the evaluation of normative principles of inductive reasoning, and a development and defense of a contextualist account of knowledge. Part 2 is concerned with conditional propositions, and conditional reasoning, with chapters on the logic and formal semantics of conditionals, a discussion of the relation between indicative and subjunctive conditionals and of the question whether indicative conditionals express propositions, a chapter considering the relation between counterfactual propositions and objective chance, a critique of an attempt to give a metaphysical reduction of counterfactual propositions to nonconditional matters of fact, and a discussion of dispositional properties, and of a dispositional theory of chance.