NATURAL LAW, CONSENT, AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy
2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Herbert

AbstractIn this paper, I attempt to defend an older, non-normative approach to Hobbes's philosophy. I argue, against recent theories that maintain Hobbes's philosophy contains a normative theory of human behavior “which prescribes proper or morally permissible modes of action both within civil society and outside it”, that Hobbesian natural right and natural law are not normative postulates of a moral (normative) theory of political obligation but, rather, were considered by Hobbes to be, in the case of natural right, empirically verifiable hypotheses about human nature, and in the case of the laws of nature, nothing more than rationally consistent principles of natural self-interest, or the logic of natural right, based on the principles of Hobbes's physics and psychology.


Locke Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jacob Donald Chatterjee

This article presents a new understanding of how the context of Restoration debates around toleration, magisterial authority and political obligation impinged upon Locke’s mature thought. It proposes that prominent Anglican clergymen, by utilising Hobbist ideas in their arguments for religious conformity, transformed the debate around toleration. In particular, Samuel Parker’s Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie’s potent mix of Hobbism, theological moralism and Scholastic natural law led to important nonconformists, such as Owen and Ferguson, reshaping their arguments in response. They were forced to make an argument upon first principles as to precisely why Parker’s naturalistic account of ecclesiastical authority was inadequate to justify their own particular view of religious institutions. Crucially, the specific features of Parker’s argument, led to John Humfrey, a largely overlooked figure, developing a set of ideas that preconfigured Locke’s later thought. This article then highlights Locke’s creative engagement with the ideas of his time, by charting the changes to Locke’s ecclesiology and view of natural law from 1667-1674, alongside the similar conceptual shifts made by Humfrey.


Author(s):  
Leonard Ferry ◽  

Political authority is not eliminable, even if in a globalizing world order the particulars of its exercise might be undergoing a transformation. What matters to political philosophy is whether or not its existence and exercise can be justified. In this paper I begin by contrasting two paradigmatic approaches to justifications of political authority and political obligation: political naturalism and political voluntarism. Having set the stage for the debate, I connect Aquinas’s account of political authority with the former—though one will not find a full-fledged version of that account in this paper (it appears elsewhere). More importantly, I connect Aquinas’s naturalist defense of political obligation to a non-instrumental account of the common good, though the bulk of the paper deals with what I argue are failed attempts to offer non-naturalist accounts of the common good as alternative natural law defenses of political authority.


1957 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-128
Author(s):  
L. L. Y. Lacambra

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-198
Author(s):  
Michael Sevel

One of the central claims of Larry May’s Limiting Leviathan (Oxford University Press, 2013) is that Hobbes’s theory of law is best understood as a kind of “procedural natural law” theory akin to the one developed by Lon Fuller in the mid-twentieth century. May’s interpretation of Hobbes suggests at least two different views of the role of equity as a constraint on legal validity; neither of them bears any important affinities with Fuller’s theory. May however makes a stronger case that Hobbes and Fuller share broadly similar views about how and why citizens have an obligation to obey the law; the affinities between the two are therefore found in their theories of political obligation rather than in their theories of law.


Author(s):  
David Boucher

This chapter examines Edmund Burke's political thought. It first provides a short biography of Burke before discussing the three main interpretations of him: first, as a utilitarian; second, in relation to natural law; and the third, which attempts to bring together the two antithetical interpretations. It argues that even though Burke has elements of utilitarianism in his thought, and although he subscribes to natural law and universal principles, both somehow have to coincide in the traditions and institutional practices of a community. On the question of political obligation, although he uses the language of contract, it is clear that Burke does not subscribe to its central tenets. The chapter proceeds by exploring Burke's views on sovereignty, constitutionalism, colonialism, and slavery.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 276-292
Author(s):  
Nicola Marcucci

This article explores the relation between Durkheim and Tönnies’ sociological thinking. Instead of focusing on their divergences, it shows how the content of their mutual criticisms, before being naturalized in national sociological traditions, reveals a shared epistemological aim: to rethink modern moral and political obligation via sociological theory. From this perspective, the opposition between Durkheim’s social fact and Tönnies’ social will reveals how classical sociological theory has been engaged in a general critisicm of modern natural law in order to furnish a different understanding of modern poltical concepts, in particular of the notion of state.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-92
Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

There is a story about the connection between the rise of consent theories of political obligation and the fall of natural law theories of political obligation that is popular among political philosophers but nevertheless false. The story is, to put it crudely, that the rise of consent theory in the modern period coincided with, and came as a result of, the fall of the natural law theory that dominated during the medieval period. Neat though it is, the story errs doubly, for it supposes both that consent did not play a key role in natural law theories of political authority offered in the medieval period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the view of Aquinas, perhaps the paradigmatic natural law theorist) and that natural law theory did not play a key role in the consent theories of political authority offered in the modern period (a supposition falsified by close inspection of the views of Hobbes and Locke, perhaps the paradigmatic consent theorists).


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