Causal Powers and Structures

2021 ◽  
pp. 271-283
Author(s):  
Brian Ellis
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Metaphysical Necessity ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dispositional Essentialism ◽  
Dispositional Properties

Brian Ellis provides a detailed and systemic overview of his version of dispositional essentialism. Ellis is famous for having developed and defended a mixed ontology for scientific realism. This is a robustly Aristotelian ontology that involves a mix of categorical and essentially dispositional properties inhering as universal in individualized entities. In this contribution, Ellis briefly defends this sort of ontology by arguing that it, or something very much like it, is necessary to provide an account of the system of reality discovered through modern science. It is, moreover, entirely adequate for the job of accounting for the ontology of modern science. He then turns to consider three objections to his ontology. The first is what other contributors will call the ‘directedness problem’, which is the idea that powers are directed at their manifestation in a way analogous to the directedness of intentionality. The second is what other contributors call the ‘intrinsicness problem’, which is the idea that causal powers are intrinsic to or inhering in their subject. The third is what other contributors call the ‘necessity problem’, which is the idea that there is something important and distinctive about metaphysical necessity vis-à-vis logical necessity.

scholarly journals Humean Laws in an unHumean World

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAMUEL KIMPTON-NYE
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Dispositional Properties

ABSTRACT:I argue that an unHumean ontology of irreducibly dispositional properties might be fruitfully combined with what has typically been thought of as a Humean account of laws, namely, the best-system account, made popular by David Lewis (e.g., 1983, 1986, 1994). In this paper I provide the details of what I argue is the most defensible account of Humean laws in an unHumean world. This package of views has the benefits of upholding scientific realism while doing without any suspect metaphysical entities to account for natural law. I conclude by arguing that the Humean laws-unHumean ontology package is well placed to provide an account of objective, nontrivial chances, a famous stumbling block for the Humean laws-Humean ontology package developed by Lewis.

scholarly journals Abstract Objects in the Causal Order

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Justin Ngai
Keyword(s):  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Causal Order ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
The Third ◽  
Abstract Entities ◽  
To Come

<p>Abstract entities have long been viewed as entities that lack causal powers; that is, they cannot be constitutive of causes or effects. This thesis aims to reject this claim and argue that abstract objects are indeed part of the causal order. I will call this thesis ‘AOCO’ for short. In the first chapter I argue that other philosophers have committed themselves to the claim that some abstract objects have been caused to come into existence. In the second chapter, I argue that the best solution to Benacerraf’s problem is to concede that abstract objects have a causal influence on what we believe. In the third chapter I examine and evaluate objections to AOCO.</p>

Vitalism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Bechtel ◽  
Robert C. Richardson
Keyword(s):  
Modern Science ◽  
Third Century ◽  
Movement Perception ◽  
The Third ◽  
Biological Phenomena ◽  
Living Things ◽  
Living Organisms ◽  
Mechanical Devices ◽  
Élan Vital ◽  
Mechanistic View

Vitalists hold that living organisms are fundamentally different from non-living entities because they contain some non-physical element or are governed by different principles than are inanimate things. In its simplest form, vitalism holds that living entities contain some fluid, or a distinctive ‘spirit’. In more sophisticated forms, the vital spirit becomes a substance infusing bodies and giving life to them; or vitalism becomes the view that there is a distinctive organization among living things. Vitalist positions can be traced back to antiquity. Aristotle’s explanations of biological phenomena are sometimes thought of as vitalistic, though this is problematic. In the third century bc, the Greek anatomist Galen held that vital spirits are necessary for life. Vitalism is best understood, however, in the context of the emergence of modern science during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena were extended to biological systems by Descartes and his successors. Descartes maintained that animals, and the human body, are ‘automata’, mechanical devices differing from artificial devices only in their degree of complexity. Vitalism developed as a contrast to this mechanistic view. Over the next three centuries, numerous figures opposed the extension of Cartesian mechanism to biology, arguing that matter could not explain movement, perception, development or life. Vitalism has fallen out of favour, though it had advocates even into the twentieth century. The most notable is Hans Driesch (1867–1941), an eminent embryologist, who explained the life of an organism in terms of the presence of an entelechy, a substantial entity controlling organic processes. Likewise, the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1874–1948) posited an élan vital to overcome the resistance of inert matter in the formation of living bodies.

Scientific Realism and the Romantic Reaction Against Reason

2021 ◽  
pp. 130-144
Author(s):  
Steven L. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Ultimate Reality ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Limited Role ◽  
Dominant Feature ◽  
Truth Claims

A so-called Romantic counterpoint to the proclamation of the hegemony of reason by Enlightenment thinkers blossomed in the nineteenth century in the form of philosophies that explicitly challenged the rationalist domination of Western philosophy and the truth claims of modern science. Thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson formulated philosophies in which reason played only a limited role either in understanding human affairs or in apprehending reality. For Kierkegaard, reality transcended reason, while for Schopenhauer, human will was the ultimate reality. For Nietzsche, will was the dominant feature of humanity, which guaranteed that reason could not achieve a synoptic understanding of experience, let alone apprehend reality: reasoning could at best achieve partial perspectives on human experience. Bergson offered the most developed alternative to reason, especially modern science-based reasoning, to penetrate experience to reality.

The Logical Necessity of Multi-Disciplinarity: A Consistent View of the World

1986 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-187
Author(s):  
Stephen Jay Kline
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Integrated Control ◽  
Life Forms ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
The Third ◽  
Control Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Hierarchical Structure

For three hundred years two conflicting views of the world (1) have provided the overall frameworks for thought in western culture. The present paper shows neither view is sufficient for human understanding of many important systems and behaviors. A third view which appears sufficient is presented. Illustrations of the third view show increased understanding is obtained in many problems. The sufficiency of the historic views and the route to the third view are provided through discussion of the issue of multi-disciplinarity, the question of whether it is possible to base everything we know on one discipline, or, on the contrary, if there is a logical necessity for using principles and concepts from many disciplines to achieve human understanding of the world. The present article provides three distinct proofs of the logical necessity of multi-disciplinarity. The proofs proceed via study of: (1) the hierarchical structure of proto-typical systems in various areas of human concern; (2) the use of “integrated-control-information” by life forms and human artifacts; and (3) an extension of the theory of dimensions. The three proofs interlock, confirm, and extend each other.

scholarly journals المقبول: استعمالاته ودلالاته لدى أهل الحديث والحافظ ابن حجر العسقلاني

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Mohd Fauzi Mohd Amin ◽  
Helimy Aris ◽  
Samer Najeh Abdullah Samarh
Keyword(s):  
Modern Science ◽  
The Novel ◽  
The Third ◽  
Good For

The study deals with the concepts of the term “acceptable” when the scholars of Hadith in general and Hafiz Ibn Hajar in his book approximation of refinement. The scholars differed in determining the degree of modernity accepted to four opinions: First: weak speech progresses to follow up to Hassan others, and this opinion Sheikh Ahmed Shaker, Sheikh Shu’aib Arnaout, Dr. Bashar Marouf Awad, because Hafiz said that the narrator of the sixth rank Lin talk only if he retires, And the modern speech described for the weak talk as is known to each student of modern science. This is the view of Dr. Walid Al-Ani, followed by some researchers, including Dr. Khuloud Al-Hakban, Dr. Shahid Karim Falih, and his article is a summary of what Dr. Al-Waid Al-Ani wrote. They supported their opinion with evidence: Including Ibn Hibban in his Saheeh, Ibn Khuzaymah in his Saheeh, and Al-Quds in the chosen. Accepted at Ibn Hajar corresponds to Imam al-Bukhaari. Ibn Hajar improved himself to the Acceptedspeech. The third view is that it is good for others, and this is the view of Professor Muhammad ‘Issa Khalifa Al-Hussein. His argument is that many scholars, such as Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar, have improved some of the hadeeths of the narrated narrators if they have a different path. A follow-up, and the owner of this view to consider him as a follow-up promotion to Hassan others. This is the opinion of Professor Mohammed Ragheb Rashed Al-Jaitan and his argument: that the accepted is another term for the unknown or unknown, and the majority of scholars respond to the novel of the unknown because of its lack of justice and restraint, and that the conditions of the accepted Ibn Hajar does not contribute to the removal Ibn Hajar himself has set the conditions for invoking the unknown hadith to authenticate him, not from the uniqueness of his novel or from the uniqueness of his novel if he is worthy of documentation, and that the hadith An unknown person or a person who is conceited does not call out a response or accept it unless he is aware of his condition. It is clear from the above that it is acceptable either to be anonymous to the eye if one is narrated from it, and it is not related to the documentation and the wound, or it is unknown, if two or more of them are narrated by him, and he is unaware of the documentation or the wound. The sheikhs, whether he is unique to this imam or narrated by others, or narrated by the two Sahihs in their saheehs, or the ruling of imams on the health of his hadeeth or his hadeeth. 

scholarly journals Alternative Definitions of Complexity for Practical Applications of Model Selection Criteria

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Murari Andrea ◽  
Riccardo Rossi ◽  
Teddy Craciunescu
Keyword(s):  
Model Selection ◽  
Selection Criteria ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Model Selection Criteria ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
The Third ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Good Set

Defining and quantifying complexity is one of the major challenges of modern science and contemporary societies. This task is particularly critical for model selection, which is aimed at properly identifying the most adequate equations to interpret the available data. The traditional solution of equating the complexity of the models to the number of their parameters is clearly unsatisfactory. Three alternative approaches are proposed in this work. The first one estimates the flexibility of the proposed models to quantify their potential to overfit. The second interprets complexity as lack of stability and is implemented by computing the variations in the predictions due to uncertainties in their parameters. The third alternative is focused on assessing the consistency of extrapolation of the candidate models. All the upgrades are easy to implement and typically outperform the traditional versions of model selection criteria and constitute a good set of alternatives to be deployed, depending on the priorities of the investigators and the characteristics of the application.

scholarly journals Más allá de la presuposición newtoniana: propiedades genuinamente disposicionales en la mecánica cuántica

1990 ◽  
Vol 22 (66) ◽  
pp. 25-37
Author(s):  
Sergio Martínez
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Quantum System ◽  
Physical System ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Quantum Systems ◽  
Theoretical Modeling ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Modern Physics ◽  
Dispositional Properties

A central metaphysical thesis of modern science has been the idea that the structure of a physical system can be explained in terms of the properties of its constitutive subsystems. I call this presupposition the Newtonian merological presupposition. After some brief introductory remarks on the role of this presupposition in the methodology of modern physics, and after mentioning some recent challenges to it, I focus my attention on quantum systems. Quantum mechanics is the only highly confirmed theory in which the Newtonian merological presupposition is denied. I argue that the presence of a non-Newtonian (holistic) merological structure is the result of the existence of two different types of properties, and in particular of the existence of genuinely dispositional properties. Genuinely dispositional properties are properties of a system which are not reducible to occurrent properties of the subsystems. This distinction between two different types of properties can be made precise in a lattice theoretical modeling of the possible properties and states attributable to a quantum system. I conclude by giving an example of the sort of genuinely dispositional properties that are constitutive of quantum systems.

Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 125-154
Author(s):  
John Worrall
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
General Theory ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
General Theory Of Relativity ◽  
The Third

What is it reasonable to believe about our most successful scientific theories such as the general theory of relativity or quantum mechanics? That they are true, or at any rate approximately true? Or only that they successfully ‘save the phenomena’, by being ‘empirically adequate’? In earlier work I explored the attractions of a view called Structural Scientific Realism (hereafter: SSR). This holds that it is reasonable to believe that our successful theories are (approximately) structurally correct (and also that this is the strongest epistemic claim about them that it is reasonable to make). In the first part of this paper I shall explain in some detail what this thesis means and outline the reasons why it seems attractive. The second section outlines a number of criticisms that have none the less been brought against SSR in the recent (and as we shall see, in some cases, not so recent) literature; and the third and final section argues that, despite the fact that these criticisms might seem initially deeply troubling (or worse), the position remains viable.

scholarly journals Towards to the mind-body problem

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 116-127
Author(s):  
Adam Skowron ◽  
Janusz Sytnik-Czetwertyński
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
The Third ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Made In

The mind-body problem is one of the most difficult challenges of modern science. An interesting attempt at providing a reductionist model of reality was made in the 18th century by Ruder Josip Bošković. The attractiveness of this model lies in the fact that it does not readily fit into any of the above categorizations. Although frequently associated with the third - a fact that laid it open to violent criticism, causing the philosopher serious trouble - it stands apart as an independent theory. For, according to Bošković, reality is neither material nor spiritual. Nor is it a union of both of these orders.

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