The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders in Common-Law Jurisdictions

Author(s):  
Christopher M. Bruner
2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Minna Yu

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-justify: inter-ideograph; text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none; tab-stops: 110.2pt;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This paper considers analyst following as a substitute way of disciplining companies and examines the joint impact of corporate governance and analyst following on valuation in an emerging-market setting.<strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> </span></strong>I find that the interaction of analyst following and corporate governance on valuation is not significant for my whole sample. Breaking down the sample to common law versus code law countries indicates that, only for common law countries, <span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">the positive relation between the quality of corporate governance and valuation is weaker for companies with greater analyst following than for companies with lower analyst following.<strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> </strong>This paper joins the stream of research on the monitoring role of financial analysts.</span></span><a name="OLE_LINK2"></a><a name="OLE_LINK1"><span style="mso-bookmark: OLE_LINK2;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> </span></span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">It extends</span> Lang et al. (2004) by examining t<span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">he joint impact of analyst following and corporate governance on valuation with a proxy of overall corporate governance quality. In addition, the finding from this paper suggests that analyst&rsquo;s governance role is more pronounced in common law countries of emerging markets where </span>analyst service is in greater need.<strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> </span></strong><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;">The results have implications for investors, analysts and managers in the common law countries of emerging markets that firms with weak corporate governance benefit more from having a high level of analyst following in terms of market valuation. <strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"></strong></span></span></span></p>


2004 ◽  
pp. 129-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tretyakov

The article focuses on the analysis of the process of convergence of outsider and insider models of corporate governance. Chief characteristics of basic and intermediate systems of corporate governance as well as the changing role of its main agents are under examination. Globalization of financial and commodity markets, convergence of legal systems, an open exchange of ideas and information are the driving forces of the convergence of basic systems of corporate governance. However the convergence does not imply the unification of institutional environment and national institutions of corporate governance.


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