Truth Commissions and Criminal Courts

Author(s):  
Alison Bisset
Author(s):  
Richard Ashby Wilson

Anthropologists have been critical of the global asymmetries of knowledge and power embedded in justice institutions established in the aftermath of violence. Truth commissions and mediation processes may be coopted by states seeking to nation-build and extend their coercive and normative capacity in local communities. International criminal courts may impose an alien version of justice that disrupts national politics and a peace process, and they often misapprehend the causes of mass crimes because they employ a form of legal inquiry that is far removed from local historical contexts. Litigation against companies for complicity in crimes against humanity may raise survivors’ expectations, only to dash them when states refuse to recognize universal jurisdiction. Even when legal recourse is not successful, new social movements focused on accountability, reparations, and legal remedy can emerge that engender new forms of sociality and political subjectivity. Anthropological investigations into transitional justice reveal a complex process in which survivors can recover an emancipatory political agency, and anthropologists testifying as experts often influence outcomes more than anticipated.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 316-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siegfried Wiessner ◽  
Andrew R. Willard

Real problems, like the problem posed, are not amenable to simple solutions. Human rights abuses in internal conflicts usually have roots deep in history and the collective psyche of the individuals and groups involved. To prevent them, the certain prospect of a swift punitive reaction on the international plane might have a useful deterrent effect. But if a violent conflict or genocide is in progress, the expectation of punishment may not by itself be likely to end the conflict. Ironically, it may prolong the plight of the persecuted, since persecutors may conclude that they have no alternative but to fight to the bitter end to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds. To deal with major incidents of unauthorized coercion and violence, an amnesty for the violators might contribute to a lessening of the toll in blood of a particular ethnic or religious rage. But that, again, might be an incomplete reaction, since the victims of the atrocities committed will not find solace, satisfaction or rehabilitation. Nor will persons who may be pathologically violent be removed from circulation. Where society remains unreconciled, jarred, conflicted—in a state of continual animosity between warring families, clans or ethnic, religious or social groups—“cold” war might heat up and erupt at any time in the future even more violently than before. Thus, truth commissions have been established in various contexts at least to shine the light of searching inquiry on situations in which truth has always been the first casualty. Still, such agencies alone might not suffice to bring about social reconciliation and restoration. Neither might bodies set up to mete out justice in the form of civil compensation. International criminal courts may send a message to people elsewhere contemplating massive violations, but they may do nothing to reconstruct the civil society that has been disrupted.


Author(s):  
Gerard A. Rainville ◽  
Steven K. Smith
Keyword(s):  

Why did Roman prosecutors typically accuse the defendant of multiple crimina, when in most standing criminal courts the punishment imposed on a guilty defendant was the same (typically “capital,” that is, a kind of exile), no matter how many charges were proven? The answer lies not in a failure to distinguish between legal charges leveled at the defendant and defamation of his character, but rather in a rhetorical strategy that made sense in light of what was legally necessary to obtain a conviction. The greater the number of charges, the more likely the jurors would be persuaded that the defendant had in some way violated the statute according to which the trial was being conducted. It is true that prosecutors typically argued that the defendant’s prior conduct made it plausible that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged, but in a way that, as much as possible, made his guilt on these particular charges seem likely, and defense patroni attempted to undermine the charges and the character defamation. This answer to the apparent contradiction between multiple charges and unitary punishment favors a moderate formalism over legal realism as the way to interpret Roman criminal trials.


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