scholarly journals PRÉCIS AND REPLIES TO CONTRIBUTORS FOR BOOK SYMPOSIUM ON ACCURACY AND THE LAWS OF CREDENCE

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
Principle Of Indifference ◽  
Book Symposium ◽  
Doxastic States

ABSTRACTThis book symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence consists of an overview of the book’s argument by the author, Richard Pettigrew, together with four commentaries on different aspects of that argument. Ben Levinstein challenges the characterisation of the legitimate measures of inaccuracy that plays a central role in the arguments of the book. Julia Staffel asks whether the arguments of the book are compatible with an ontology of doxastic states that includes full beliefs as well as credences. Fabrizio Cariani raises concerns about the argument offered in the book for various chance-credence principles. And Sophie Horowitz questions the assumptions at play in the book’s argument for the Principle of Indifference, as well as asking how the various laws of credence considered in the book relate to one another.

Book Symposium: Hobbes and Political Theory Introduction: Hobbes, Language and Liberty

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-170
Author(s):  
Richard Bourke
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
International Symposium ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Philip Pettit ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Book Symposium

AbstractHobbes's place in the history of political philosophy is a highly controversial one. An international symposium held at Queen Mary, University of London in February 2009 was devoted to debating his significance and legacy. The event focussed on recent books on Hobbes by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, and was organised around four commentaries on these new works by distinguished scholars. This paper is designed to introduce the subject of the symposium together with the commentaries and subsequent responses from Petit and Skinner. It examines the themes of language and liberty in the philosophy of Hobbes and concludes by highlighting some of the ways in which further research into Hobbes's debt to Aristotle's Politics will prove fruitful and illuminating.

Constitutional Unamendability – Four Observations

ICL Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-385
Author(s):  
Yaniv Roznai
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Book Symposium

Abstract This is a response to the contributions of Professors Lech Garlicki and Zofia A Garlicka-Sowers, Vicki C Jackson, Sabrina Ragone and Adrienne Stone, in a book symposium on Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (OUP 2017).

Book Symposium on Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology: the Case for Mediated Posthumanism By Tamar Sharon Springer, Dordrecht, 2014

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 581-599
Author(s):  
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín ◽  
Michael Hauskeller ◽  
Sandra Braman ◽  
Xavier Guchet ◽  
Tamar Sharon
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Book Symposium

Replies to Cepollaro and Torrengo, Táíwò, and Amoretti

Disputatio ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (51) ◽  
pp. 345-359
Author(s):  
Jason Stanley
Keyword(s):  
General View ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Short Piece ◽  
Book Symposium ◽  
Future Work ◽  
Oxford University Press

Abstract In this short piece belonging to a book symposium on my book How Propaganda Works (Oxford University Press, 2015), I reply to the objections, comments and suggestions provided by the contributors: Bianca Cepollaro and Giuliano Torrengo, Olúfémi O. Táíwò, and Maria Cristina Amoretti. I show how some of the objections can be accommodated by the framework adopted in the book, but also how various comments and suggestions have contributed to the development, in future work, of several threads pertaining to the general view put forward in How Propaganda Works.

Vagueness-Related Partial Belief and the Constitution of Borderline Cases

2021 ◽  
pp. 293-302
Author(s):  
Crispin Wright
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Attitude ◽  
Phenomenological Research ◽  
Borderline Case ◽  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Partial Belief ◽  
Book Symposium

This chapter, specially written for a Philosophy and Phenomenological Research book symposium on the Stephen Schiffer’s The Things We Mean, is focused on Schiffer’s proposal there concerning the most central and important question about vagueness: namely, what, specifically, something’s being a borderline case of a vague expression consists in. Schiffer argues for a new kind of approach, according to which vagueness is constitutively a psychological phenomenon, grounded in a supposedly distinctive propositional attitude taken by practitioners of vague discourse: vagueness-related partial belief (VPB), contrasting in ways Schiffer details with standard partial belief (SPB). Two principal problems are raised for this proposal. First, on Schiffer’s account, VPB looks to be characteristic of a wider range of kinds of indeterminacy besides the targeted soritical vagueness. Second, there is an awkward dilemma arising over whether or why a thinker could not, as a matter of psychological contingency, adopt a VPB towards a precise proposition.

Two Non-senses of “Probability”

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-76
Author(s):  
Wayne C. Myrvold
Keyword(s):  
Relative Frequency ◽  
The Other ◽  
Objective Probability ◽  
Sequence Of Events ◽  
Principle Of Indifference ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Eighteenth And Nineteenth Centuries

This chapter engages in some ground-clearing. Two concepts have been proposed to play the role of objective probability. One is associated with the idea that probability involves mere counting of possibilities (often wrongly attributed to Laplace). The other is frequentism, the idea that probability can be defined as long-run relative frequency in some actual or hypothetical sequence of events. Associated with the idea that probability is merely a matter of counting of possibilities is a temptation to believe that there is a principle, called the Principle of Indifference, which can generate probabilities out of ignorance. In this chapter the reasons that neither of these approaches can achieve its goal are rehearsed, with reference to historical discussions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It includes some of the prehistory of discussions of what has come to be known, misleadingly, as Bertrand’s paradox.

Heated Agreement

2021 ◽  
pp. 105-114
Author(s):  
John M. Doris
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Empirical Information ◽  
Book Symposium

This chapter was originally a contribution to a book symposium on Robert Adams’ A Theory of Virtue (2006), which develops an extended response to the arguments for character skepticism put forth in Doris’ Lack of Character (2002). It is argued that despite the differences between them, the works are actually in considerable agreement, both methodologically and substantively, when it comes to the fundamentals of moral psychology. Both sides agree that philosophical moral psychology ought to be empirically informed, and both sides agree that traditional conceptions of character traits require revision in light of empirical information.

12. Inverse probability: you can’t be indifferent about it!

2017 ◽  
pp. 84-91
Author(s):  
Graham Priest
Keyword(s):  
Intuitive Reasoning ◽  
Relevant Difference ◽  
Inverse Probability ◽  
Principle Of Indifference ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

People often confuse probabilities with their inverses. Many inductive arguments require us to reason about inverse probabilities. ‘Inverse probability: you can’t be indifferent about it!’ looks at the relationship between inverse probabilities, illustrating it with the Argument to Design, which asks: does not the fact that the physical cosmos is ordered in the way that it is give us reason to believe in the existence of a god of a certain kind? Logicians use the term Principle of Indifference to describe an important part of intuitive reasoning about probability: given a number of possibilities, with no relevant difference between them, they all have the same probability.

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