How does Spinoza’s “Democracy” differ from that of Hobbes?

Field focuses on the role in political theory of the concept of potentia of the people—power understood as the informal, natural power of the people—as distinct from potestas understood as the formal arrangement of power under the constitution of a given state. In a close analysis of the arguments of Hobbes and Spinoza on popular power and sovereignty, the book critiques democratic interpretations of both theories. While correct about that, the book neglects fundamental dissimilarities in their views of popular power. Of profound importance is the meaning of the concept “multitude”: unlike Hobbes, Spinoza distinguishes between the great mass of individuals and “the wise,” seeing the “multitude” as encompassing most kings. Also, there is a great gulf between their understandings of the “common good.” For Spinoza, obedience to the sovereign, Hobbes’s desideratum, is only compatible with freedom in the context of a state directed to the common good.

Psychology and Obligation in Hobbes: The Case of “Ought Implies Can”

Many interpreters use Hobbes’s endorsement of “ought implies can” to justify treating Hobbes’s motivational psychology as an external constraint on his normative theory. These interpreters assume that, for Hobbes, something is “possible” for a person to do only if they can be motivated to do it, and so Hobbes’s psychological theory constrains what obligations people have. I argue this assumption about what is “possible” is false and so these arguments are unsound. Looking to Hobbes’s exchange with Bramhall on free will, I argue that the sense of “possible” relevant for “ought implies can” in Hobbes’s philosophy only concerns an agent’s capacity to do something if they decide to do it. Whether a person can be motivated to do something, then, does not determine if it is possible for them. Consequently, Hobbes’s motivational psychology cannot determine what our obligations are by invoking the principle that “ought implies can.”

Thomas Hobbes on Civility, Magnanimity, and Scientific Discourse

Thomas Hobbes contends that a wise sovereign would censor books and limit verbal discourse for the majority of citizens. But this article contends that it is consistent with Hobbes’s philosophy to claim that a wise sovereign would allow a small number of citizens – those individuals who engage in scientific discourse and who are magnanimous and just – to disagree freely amongst themselves, engaging in discourse on controversial topics. This article reflects on Hobbes’s contention that these individuals can tolerate one another’s differences and engage in verbal disagreement without any risk to the commonwealth. By engaging in open discourse, these individuals can better create valuable technology and provide counsel to the sovereign that is necessary to maintain peace.

Thomas Hobbes, Diodorus Siculus, and Early Humanity

This article offers a study of Thomas Hobbes’s reading of Diodorus Siculus, a Greek historiographer of the 1st century bc whom Hobbes called “the greatest antiquary perhaps that ever was.” After offering a comparison of the works of Thucydides (often regarded as Hobbes’s greatest classical model) and Diodorus, the article traces the reception of Diodorus’ work in early modern England and examines Diodorus’ strong influence on two principal works, De Homine and Behemoth. Early human histories in the first books of Diodorus’ Bibliotheke Historike (‘Historical Library), including anthropological and cosmological narratives, are a recurrent feature of Hobbes’s focus, and a certain subversiveness animates Hobbes’s use of Diodorus and underpins his critique of contemporary theological and political structures. One result of this research is to suggest a greater place for Diodorus in Hobbes’s intellectual world than previously realised, alongside a strong appreciation for Diodorus across multiple learned discourses in the pre-modern period.

“A Factious, Seditious and Unruly Multitude”

As a child in Malmesbury, Thomas Hobbes had an opportunity to observe many of the social and political phenomena that he considered in his later work. Contemporary sources reveal that Hobbes lived in a community that was wracked by marked animosity between different social groups, frequent disorder and a lack of consensus about the legitimacy of local political institutions. There was tension between the town’s elite and a proletariat of impoverished workers. Different members of the elite clashed, sometimes violently, as they competed for local ascendancy. Hobbes’s extended family was heavily involved in these events. His hometown was deeply troubled. It was also a place where people had access to some “political” vocabulary which they used when describing their discontents and conflicts. The possible influence of Hobbes’s early experiences on his intellectual development has attracted little previous attention.