scholarly journals OUR RELIABILITY IS IN PRINCIPLE EXPLAINABLE

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Baras
Keyword(s):  
Robust Realism ◽  
Hartry Field

AbstractNon-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non-causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non-causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics (Field 1989, 2001), normativity (Enoch 2011), and even logic (Schechter 2010). In this article I offer two closely related accounts for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries.

Robust Realism Rejected

1984 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 317
Author(s):  
Thomas Leddy
Keyword(s):  
Robust Realism

Hartry Field, Saving Truth from Paradox

Erkenntnis ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-422
Author(s):  
Andrea Cantini
Keyword(s):  
Hartry Field

Bruteness and Supervenience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Robust Realism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Way

This chapter first presents a framework, one that the author has defended elsewhere (Levine 2001), for understanding the notion of bruteness, its relation to modality, and the way this framework applies to the mind–body problem. Second, the chapter then turns to a problem in meta-ethics and attempts to address this problem within the framework already established. The problem is how to reconcile two views that many philosophers, including the author, are inclined to hold: on the one hand, “robust realism” or “non-naturalism” about the ethical and, on the other, the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical. The chapter speculates about how one might reasonably reconcile these two views.

Presencia de Carnap en el nominalismo de Hartry Field

1970 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Caba Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Physical World ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Hartry Field

RESUMENDesde su perspectiva nominalista, Dield sostiene que la utilidad de los enunciados matemáticos en el mundo físico no proporciona razones suficientes para creer que sean verdaderos; en realidad, las matemáticas no son algo que pueda evaluarse adecuadamente en términos de verdad o de falsedad. Por ello, tiene que negar la existencia de entidades matemáticas y rebatir la tesis de que estas entidades sean teóricamente indispensables. En su lugar, argumenta que la utilidad de las matemáticas puede justificarse solamente por su carácter conservativo, esto es, que cualquier inferencia que pueda hacerse a partir de premisas nominalistas con su ayuda, podría haberse hecho sin ella. El principal objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que los aspectos más importantes del planteamiento de Field han sido mantenidos, hasta cierto punto, por Carnap y los empiristas lógicos.PALABRAS CLAVEEMPIRISMO LOGICO-NOMINALISMO-CARNAP-FIELDABSTRACTFrom his nominalistic point of view, Field claims that the utiity of mathematical assertions in the physical world gives no ground for believing in their trith; actually, mathematics is not the sort of thing that can be appropiately evaluated in terms of truth and falsehood. So, he has to deny that mathematical entities exist, and undermine the thesis that these entities are theoretically indispensable. he argues, instead, that the utility of mathematics can be accounted for only by its conservatiness, i.e., that any inference from nominalistic premises that can be made with the help of mathematics, could be made without it. The goal of this paper is to show that Field's main claim have been maintened, up to a point, by Carnap and the logical positivists. KEYWORDSLOGICAL EMPIRICISM-NOMINALISM-CARNAP-FIELD

The Philosophical Problem Of Truth-Of

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Cummins
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Semantic Relation ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Physical Relation ◽  
Hartry Field ◽  
Definition Of

There is a certain view abroad in the land concerning the philosophical problems raised by Tarskian semantics. This view has it that a Tarskian theory of truth in a language accomplishes nothing of interest beyond the definition of truth in terms of satisfaction, and, further, that what is missing — the only thing that would yield a solution to the philosophical problem of truth when added to Tarskian semantics — is a reduction of satisfaction to a non-semantic (and ultimately physical) relation. It seems to me that this view either misidentifies the philosophical problem altogether, or encourages a seriously misleading picture of the nature of the problem.The view I have in mind is nowhere more persuasively at work than in a recent paper by Hartry Field.1 In this paper Field argues that a Tarskian theory of truth for a natural language is impossible if we insist on Tarski's case-by-case elimination of ‘satisfies'. More fundamentally, however, he argues that a Tarskian theory could provide nothing of philosophical interest beyond the admittedly interesting reduction of truth to satisfaction, and his ground for this claim is, roughly, that a Tarskian theory does not reduce its primitive semantic relation — satisfaction — to a non-semantic relation.

scholarly journals TRUTH, LOGICAL VALIDITY AND DETERMINATENESS: A COMMENTARY ON FIELD’SSAVING TRUTH FROM PARADOX

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. D. WELCH
Keyword(s):  
Logical Validity ◽  
Hartry Field ◽  
Path Dependent

We consider notions oftruthandlogical validitydefined in various recent constructions of Hartry Field. We try to explicate his notion ofdeterminate truthby clarifying thepath-dependent hierarchiesof hisdeterminateness operator.

The Fragility of Robust Realism: A Reply to Dreyfus and Spinosa

Inquiry ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Malpas
Keyword(s):  
Robust Realism

Practical Incommensurability and the Phenomenological Basis of Robust Realism

Inquiry ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-88
Author(s):  
Mark A. Wrathall
Keyword(s):  
Robust Realism
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