Foreign aid: its speckled past and future prospects

1975 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Frank ◽  
Mary Baird

At the present time, the political popularity of foreign assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, has reached a low point in the United States. The lack of enthusiasm is epitomized by the vote of the House of Representatives in January 1974 against the United States's pledge of $550 million to support the International Development Association (IDA), the soft-loan subsidiary of the World Bank (even though that vote was subsequently reversed). Total US commitments of official development assistance have declined from 0.59 percent of GNP in 1963 to 0.29 percent in 1972.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 382-406
Author(s):  
Franck Maxime Yankam Lemdjo

Article 4(10) of the World Bank Articles of Agreements (hereafter referred the World Bank Charter) adopted in 1944 prohibits World Bank staff from taking political factors into account in their operations and loans decisions for projects of development. Article 4(10) has been at the heart of a sound debate that is reviewed in this paper in relation to human rights and corruption. The discussion is a step further of the colloquium referred as the “Justice and Development Week” organised in November 2010 by the World Bank Legal Vice Presidency Law held in Washington- USA. The purpose of that international meeting was to examine the political prohibition clause in International Development Finance. One of the issues raised during the seminar was the interpretation of the World Bank Charter particularly its Article 4(10).This article discusses the matter and focuses mainly on major issues of the political clause: First, the historical reasons of the insertion of the political prohibition clause in the World Bank Charter and the arguments in support of as well as in opposition to such a restrictive approach by the Bank to engaging with corruption and human rights issues. Second, an analytical discussion of the Bank’s economic perspective and exclusive definition to corruption followed by the legal discrepancies of such a regime of sanctions in comparison with those set by UN and AU anti-corruption conventions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 223386592110248
Author(s):  
Yooneui Kim ◽  
Youngwan Kim

Are international organizations autonomous actors in global politics? This paper investigates whether and how major powers influence the World Bank’s official development assistance policies. Despite the World Bank’s attempts to maintain independence from its member states, we argue that major powers are still influential. Testing this expectation with the data of official development assistance provisions between 1981 and 2017, we find that the World Bank provides a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipient countries that receive a higher amount of such assistance from the major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan. In addition, the World Bank is prone to provide a higher amount of official development assistance to the recipients that have a similar preference to the major powers. This study sheds light on the relations between major powers and international organizations.


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