Terry H. Anderson. The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947. Columbia, Missouri and London: University of Missouri Press, 1981. Pp. xiv, 256. $18.00.

1982 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-261
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Schlauch
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
The United States ◽  
University Of Missouri ◽  
The Cold War

Response to James Lebovic's review of Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 1169-1170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Iraq War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Foreign Policy Analysis ◽  
History Of ◽  
Bright Side ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Cold War

Among the many issues raised by James Lebovic's perceptive review are two that strike me as crucial: the relationships between intelligence and social science and those between intelligence and policymaking. The first itself has two parts, one being how scholars can study intelligence. Both access and methods are difficult. For years, diplomatic historians referred to intelligence as the “hidden dimension” of their subject. Now it is much more open, and Great Britain, generally more secretive than the United States, has just issued the authorized history of MI5 (see Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, 2009). Since the end of the Cold War, the CIA has released extensive, if incomplete, records, and the bright side (for us) of intelligence failures is that they lead to the release of treasure troves of documents, which can often be supplemented by memoirs and interviews. But even more than in other aspects of foreign policy analysis, we are stuck with evidence that is fragmentary. In this way, we resemble scholars of ancient societies, who forever lament the loss of most of the material they want to study.

The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947

1982 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 501
Author(s):  
Lloyd C. Gardner ◽  
Terry H. Anderson ◽  
Robert M. Hathaway
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Cold War

Hermann J. Muller, Theodosius Dobzhansky, Leslie Clarence Dunn, and the Reaction to Lysenkoism in the United States

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-118
Author(s):  
William deJong-Lambert
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Natural Selection ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
The United States ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Theodosius Dobzhansky ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Recent Synthesis

This article outlines the response of three U.S. geneticists—Hermann Muller, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and Leslie Dunn—to the anti-genetics campaign launched by the Soviet agronomist Trofim Lysenko. The Cold War provided a hospitable environment for Lysenko's argument that genetics was racist, fascist science. In 1948, at a session of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Lysenko succeeded in banning genetics in the USSR. The movement against genetics soon spread to Soviet-allied states around the globe. Efforts to rebut Lysenkoism were launched in the United States, Great Britain, and other Western countries by scientists who saw Lysenko as a pseudo-scientific charlatan. Muller, Dobzhansky, and Dunn were among the biologists most active in this counter-campaign. The history of their campaign reveals the challenges scientists faced at an important moment in the field of biology, with the recent synthesis of genetics and Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection, as well as the difficulties of engaging in politics and persuading a lay audience to support their ideas.

The hijacking of a pact: the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, 1955—1958

1993 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel John Ashton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
The United States ◽  
Canal Zone ◽  
Suez Crisis ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Impact

The creation of the Baghdad Pact, a regional defence organization linking Britain to Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, in 1955, has been surrounded by historiographical confusion. Much of this is explicable in terms of the impact of rapid international changes on long-term strategy, the importance of which has tended to be neglected by historians of the pact. So, one school of thought focuses on the American promotion of the ‘Northern Tier’ concept during the period 1953–4, and on the British preference for an organization based on her Suez Canal Zone Base in Egypt.1 Applyingthis concept to the year 1955, the Baghdad Pact can become ‘the United States’ final victory over Great Britain during the Cold War, a victory which the Suez Crisis of 1956 served to confirm.

Trust, but Verify

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
East West

This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.

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