Anecdotes, omniscience, and associative learning in examining the theory of mind

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-122
Author(s):  
Steven M. Green ◽  
David L. Wilson ◽  
Siân Evans

We suggest that anecdotes have evidentiary value in interpreting nonhuman primate behavior. We also believe that any outcome from the experiments proposed by Heyes can be interpreted as a product of previous experience with trainers or as associative learning using the experimental cues. No potential outcome is clearcut evidence for or against the theory of mind proposition.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Halina

In order to assess the status of replication in comparative psychology, it is important to clarify what constitutes a replicated experiment. In this paper, I adopt the Resampling Account of replication recently advanced by the philosopher Edouard Machery. I apply this account to an area of comparative psychology—namely, nonhuman primate theory of mind research. Two key findings emerge from this analysis. First, under the account of replication advanced here, genuine replications are common in comparative psychology. Second, I argue that different types of replications offer different epistemic benefits to researchers. This finding diverges from Machery’s view. Finally, I suggest that community-level change is needed in order to promote a wide range of replications and their associated diversity of epistemic benefits.


1994 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 658-659
Author(s):  
Irwin S. Bernstein

1972 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas K. Candland ◽  
Lawrence Dresdale ◽  
Jeffrey Leiphart ◽  
Carl Johnson

1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Parker

Study of “theory of mind” in nonhuman primates is hampered both by the lack of rigorous methodology that Heyes stresses and by our lack of knowledge of the cognitive neuroscience of nonhuman primate conceptual structure. Recent advances in this field indicate that progress can be made by first asking simpler research questions.


1998 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. Heyes

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.


Infancy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Crivello ◽  
Shawna Grossman ◽  
Diane Poulin‐Dubois

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