During litigation on the international plane, states sometimes will issue assurances either to the other litigant or to the international court directly. This article explores how those assurances interact with applications for provisional measures. The practice of courts varies with regard to how to react to these assurances, though the usual approach is that assurances issued to another state or individual are generally non-binding, while assurances issued to the court directly are binding. At the same time, litigants can apply to the court for provisional measures to prevent actions that would disturb the dispute. When the assurances are considered non-binding, they are treated as questions of fact and can be assessed for credibility and reliability, as a part of the provisional measures analysis. But when the assurances are considered binding, they are treated as questions of law, and the undertaken legal obligation disposes of the request for a provisional measures order. This article will examine the practices of the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights on this issue, identifying where their practices diverge and converge, and recommending that the dual nature of assurances, as both factual and legal, be considered in assessing their value.
Remarks by Maria Flores