scholarly journals Regulators and environmental groups: better together or apart?

Author(s):  
Ana Espinola-Arredondo ◽  
Eleni Stathopoulou ◽  
Felix Munoz-Garcia

Abstract This paper examines green alliances between environmental groups (EGs) and polluting firms, which have become more common in the last decades, and analyzes how they affect policy design. We first show that the activities of regulators and EGs are strategic substitutes, giving rise to free-riding incentives on both agents. Nonetheless, the presence of the EG yields smaller welfare benefits when firms are subject to regulation than when they are not. In addition, the introduction of environmental policy yields large welfare gains when the EG is absent but small benefits when the EG is already present.

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Espínola-Arredondo ◽  
Huan Zhao

AbstractThis paper analyzes how a tax/subsidy policy affects consumers' behavior when choosing between green (pollution-free goods) and conventional products, and its effects on welfare when a proportion of consumers have strong preferences for green goods. We analyze a Hotelling's linear city model where final products by two firms are symmetric in all dimensions except for the externality their production process generates. Our efficiency comparisons suggest that, under a setting of horizontal product differentiation, an environmental regulation (either on polluting firms or consumers buying their products) yields higher social welfare than the absence of policy. Moreover, the proportion of consumers who prefer green products affects the welfare gains from a subsidy or tax policy.


Author(s):  
Suzuette S. Soomai

Governmental organisations produce vast quantities of scientific information on the state of the marine and coastal environment which is often intended to guide policy-making to mitigate or reverse the declining trends in the health of the environment. How scientific information is used and how it influences environmental policy and decision making are however not well understood. The apparent disconnect between the knowledge and information produced by scientists and that used by policy makers is attributed to problems at the science-policy interface. Based on a multi-disciplinary literature review, this paper describes how policy makersseek out and use scientific information within the context of policy design in the 21st century. Best practices for increasing information flows across the science-policy interface are drawn from a study of the awareness, use, and influence of The 2009 State of the Nova Scotia Coast Report in coastal policy making in Nova Scotia.Strategic or rational approaches to policy making can increase the two-way flow of information across the science-policy interface as it facilitates collaboration among multiple actors in information generation, transmis-sion, and use. The production, use, and influence of The 2009 State ofNova Scotia's Coast Report in coastal policy making in Nova Scotia demonstrates the strategic approach to policy making whereby coastal policy is being developed through (i) intergovernmental partnerships, (ii) the use of best available information, (iii) linkages between the policy process and policy output, and (iv) public participation.


Author(s):  
Martin Baekgaard ◽  
Donald P Moynihan ◽  
Mette Kjærgaard Thomsen

Abstract Administrative burdens affect peoples’ experience of public administration but there is, to date, limited evidence to as why policymakers are willing to accept and impose burdens. To address this gap, we draw from the policy design and administrative burden literatures to develop the concept of burden tolerance—the willingness of policymakers and people more generally to passively allow or actively impose state actions that result in others experiencing administrative burdens. Drawing on a survey experiment and observational data with Danish local politicians in a social welfare setting, we find that more right-wing politicians are more tolerant of burdens, but politicians are less willing to impose burdens on a welfare claimant perceived as being more deserving. Politicians with a personal experience of receiving welfare benefits themselves are less tolerant of burdens, while information about the psychological costs experienced by claimants did not reduce burden tolerance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8553
Author(s):  
Elias Asproudis ◽  
Thomas Weyman-Jones

In this article, we explain how several environmental groups are attempting to influence environmental policy by changing the total amount of pollution allowed within the tradable emissions market. We highlight the case where environmental groups may participate in strategic behaviour to resemble co-operative coalition behaviour. We present an interesting way that environmental groups can encourage their goal of reducing pollution, contrary to the industrial/business groups’ desires. This is a major concern in our world, and such a new approach could be adopted more broadly.


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amit K. Biswas ◽  
Marcel Thum

AbstractThe authors develop a simple analytical framework to study the welfare-maximizing environmental standards when market entry is endogenous and firms can circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes the tradeoff in environmental policy. Corruption leads more polluting firms to enter into the market, which requires tighter environmental regulation. However, corruption also makes trading in some environmental protection for a marginally higher market entry optimal for the government.


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