Mental Logic Versus Mental Models

1992 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 438-439
Author(s):  
Richard A. Griggs
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Mental Logic

Graphical Logic Paradigm and Reasoning Process Research

2014 ◽  
Vol 1006-1007 ◽  
pp. 1084-1091 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ren Long ◽  
Yi Ting Zhang ◽  
Yu Hui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Process Research ◽  
Problem Difficulty ◽  
Reasoning Process ◽  
Reasoning Test ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Mental Logic

Through the mental models, mental logic and raven's graphic reasoning test research, this paper deduced a series of graphic reasoning paradigm, and summarized the process of graphical reasoning. Through the demonstration of problem difficulty experiment and written report experiment, confirmed a high relevance between the graphic logic steps iteration and species and questions difficulty. Furthermore, reasoning order and default graphical reasoning paradigm have a high degree of agreement. Confirmed the rationality and widespread adaptability of graphic reasoning paradigms.

The mental logic and mental models of indicative conditionals

If ◽  
2004 ◽  
pp. 53-72
Author(s):  
Jonathan St B T Evans ◽  
David E Over
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Indicative Conditionals ◽  
Mental Logic

Ninth Bartlett Memorial Lecture. Thinking as a Skill

1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. N. Johnson-Laird
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Memorial Lecture ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
High Level ◽  
Mental Logic

There are two conflicting views about the nature of thought: it is invariably rational or invariably irrational. Bartlett argued that thinking is a high level skill, and this idea suggests an obvious third possibility: thought is sometimes rational and sometimes irrational. This view is defended in the present paper, which argues that the doctrine of logical infallibility is either falsified by the results of some experiments on syllogistic reasoning or else empirically vacuous. There is no need to postulate a mental logic of the sort that Piaget and others have proposed. The rapid implicit inferences of daily life depend on the ability to interpret sentences by constructing mental models of the states of affairs that they describe. Deliberate deductions depend on the further ability to search for alternative models that violate putative conclusions. All that you need to know to assess validity is the fundamental semantic principle of deduction: an inference is valid if, and only if, its conclusion is true in every situation in which its premises are true and there is no way of interpreting the premises so as to render the conclusion false. This principle guides the construction of all logics though it is not explicitly stated in any of them. The paper concludes by examining the ways in which people differ in their ability to reason, the practical need to improve this ability, and some of the pedagogical implications of the present studies.

scholarly journals The Problems of the Mental Logic with the Double Negation: The Necessity of a Semantic Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-153
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Double Negation ◽  
Semantic Approach ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
Ancient Times ◽  
Syntactic Theories ◽  
Mental Logic ◽  
Mental Models Theory

Abstract The double negation has always been considered by the logical systems from ancient times to the present. In fact, that is an issue that the current syntactic theories studying human reasoning, for example, the mental logic theory, address today. However, in this paper, I claim that, in the case of some languages such as Spanish, the double negation causes problems for the cognitive theories mainly based on formal schemata and supporting the idea of a universal syntax of thought in the human mind. Thus, I propose that, given those problems, semantic frameworks such as that of the mental models theory seem to be more appropriate for explaining the human inferential activity.

scholarly journals Mental Logic and the Denials of Conjunctions and Disjunctions

2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Mental Logic ◽  
Mental Models Theory

ABSTRACT: The mental models theory predicts that, while conjunctions are easier than disjunctions for individuals, when denied, conjunctions are harder than disjunctions. Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird proved that this prediction is correct in their work of 2014. In this paper, I analyze their results in order to check whether or not they really affect the mental logic theory. My conclusion is that, although Khemlani et al.'s study provides important findings, such findings do not necessarily lead to questioning or to rejecting the mental logic theory.

scholarly journals Analytic Sentences, Cognition, and Language: Some Links between Current Theories

2019 ◽  
pp. 61-69
Author(s):  
Miguel López-Astorga
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Probability Logic ◽  
Mental Logic ◽  
The Way ◽  
Mental Models Theory

This paper tries to explore possible relations and differences between three kinds of contemporary theories about cognition and language: the approaches supporting the idea that there is a mental logic, the mental models theory, and the frameworks based upon probability logic. That exploration is made here by means of the analytic sentences and the revision of the way each of those types of theories can deal with them. The conclusions seem to show that the three kinds of theories address such sentences in a similar manner, which can mean that there can be more links between them than thought.

Mental models cannot exclude mental logic and make little sense without it

1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin D. S. Braine
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Mental Logic
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