Serpent Handling: Toward a Cognitive Account – Honoring the Scholarship of Ralph W. Hood Jr.

The ritual handling of serpents remains an unnoticed cultural form for the explanatory aims and theoretical insights desired by cognitive scientists of religion. In the current article, we introduce the Hood and Williams archives at The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga that contains data culled from Hood’s 40-plus year career of studying serpent handlers. The archives contain hundreds of hours of interviews and recordings of speaking in tongues, handling fire, drinking poison, and taking up serpents by different congregants and congregations. The archive remains a rich but untapped source of data for building, testing, and refining cognitive theories of ritual in general, and serpent handling in specific. We connect Hood’s work to current cognitive theories and engage critically with research on the social functions of ritual. Finally, we discuss several further reasons to pay more attention to SHS communities and practices in cognitive theories of ritual.

Perception of Absence

We are able to see what is not there, such as when a car has been stolen and is not where the owner expected it to be. There is some kind of phenomenological feel to such discoveries but it is uncertain and elusive. There is a distinction between seeing the absence of something and merely inferring its absence from what is seen. Two theories of how it is possible to see what is not there are considered: perceptual theories, which claim absences can be experienced, and cognitive theories that appeal to an inference. Both have problems. Perceptual theories struggle to say how something that is not there can be an object of perception while cognitive theories cannot say how the required inference is drawn. As an alternative, an evolved mechanism is invoked that allows a non-deductive inference to an absence that is then presented in the mind as experiential.

The Passionate Beliefs. A Defense of the Cognitive-Evaluative Theory of Emotions

The philosophy of emotions has long been dominated by the view called «cognitivism». According to it, emotions are characterized (and definable) not by mere physical impulses but by a cognitive evaluation of their object. However, despite their success, cognitive theories have to deal with various objections and are divided on how to answer to them. In this essay I want to defend the form of cognitivism claimed by Martha Nussbaum from the most common criticisms. After a brief summary of her account, I confront some of the objections that have been raised against it. In Section 2 I deal with the classic problem of emotions in infants and animals, which lack linguistic abilities. Later, I confront the potential problem represented by cases in which one’s emotion and reasoned judgment seem to differ: in paragraph 3 I consider irrational phobias and fears, to show how they can be accounted for in terms of judgments and thoughts, and not only of perceptions; in paragraph 4 I deal with the objection that «judgementalist» theories (that is, those that describe emotions in terms of judgments and beliefs) violate the «principle of charity», for they ascribe an excessive irrationality to people. I argue that experimental evidence suggest that it is not implausible to assume that people have contradictory beliefs under conditions of uncertainty, and that perceptual theories of emotion (which compare emotional conflicts to optical illusions) fail to account for some fundamental aspects of these phenomena. Finally, in paragraph 5, I deal with the objection according to which a cognitive-evaluative theory cannot explain the sense of passivity that we commonly experience in emotions.

Perceptual Emotions and Emotional Virtue

In this essay I focus on two areas discussed in Michael Brady’s Emotion: The Basics, namely perceptual models of emotion and the relation between emotion and virtue. Brady raises two concerns about perceptual theories: that they arguably collapse into feeling or cognitive theories of emotion; and that the analogy between emotion and perception is questionable at best, and is thus not an adequate way of characterizing emotion. I argue that a close look at perception and emotional experience reveals a structure of emotion that avoids these problems. I then explore other ways in which emotions can be operative in virtuous acts and virtue traits outside of their relation to motivation. The patterns of emotional response that we have can affect virtue because they affect the way in which we see and take-in information about the world, and the gravity that such perceptions have for us. In addition, emotions are critical to virtue because they maintain the level of importance that values have for us, and in doing so forestall axiological entropy, namely the fading of the importance that values have for us, and thus the virtues that are dependent on those values.

An Active Inference Model of Conscious Access with and without Report

Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of report. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability – maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.

A moderated mediation study of consumer extrinsic motivation and CSR beliefs towards organic drinking products in an emerging economy

PurposePrevious research has yielded mixed results on the relationship between consumer perception and purchase intention towards organic food products. Although the prior literature has widely applied planned behaviour theory, using a single theoretical approach often provides limited understanding of organic food consumption. This study builds upon consumer perception and social cognitive theories to examine the effects of perceived food healthiness and environmental consciousness on the purchase intention of organic drinking products. The current research also assesses the mediating role of consumer extrinsic motivation and moderating role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) beliefs in these effects.Design/methodology/approachA survey method was applied to collect data from 606 consumers from different food retailers in Vietnam. Data were analysed using multivariate analysis techniques, such as structural equation modelling and bootstrap analysis.FindingsResults of hypothesis testing support the predictive ability of perception and social cognitive theories in explaining consumers' perceptions, motivation and behavioural intention towards organic drinking products. Furthermore, results provide evidence for the moderating effect of CSR beliefs on the relationship between consumer extrinsic motivation and purchase intention.Originality/valueThis study may be amongst the first that explains consumption of organic drinking products from the perspectives of consumer perception and social cognitive theories. It provides a unique research model that explains the influence of perceived food healthiness and environmental consciousness on purchase intention of organic drinking products with the mediating role of consumer extrinsic motivation and moderating role of CSR beliefs. The current research provides fresh insights into the consumption of organic drinking products in an emerging market based on a mediated moderation mechanism, which has been limited in the prior literature.

Older adults in virtual communities: understanding the antecedents of knowledge contribution and knowledge seeking through the lens of socioemotional selectivity and social cognitive theories

Purpose As older adults are increasingly active in virtual communities (VCs), these platforms for knowledge exchange present opportunities for companies to use elder human capital. The purpose of this study is to understand the antecedent factors that motivate older adults’ knowledge contribution and knowledge seeking (KS) behaviors in VCs. Design/methodology/approach Rooted in socio-emotional selectivity and social cognitive theories, this study included five key variables and developed models for older adults’ knowledge contributing (KC)/KS behaviors. This paper tested the hypotheses using data from a sample of 204 older adults in 3 VCs in China. Findings The results provide support for most of the hypotheses and show that while other members’ participation (MP) acts as a substitute for meaning in life and attitude toward aging, it acts as a complement for outcome expectations (OE) focused on others and OE focused on oneself in their impacts on KC/KS activities. Practical implications The study provides practical insights for developing elder human resources via VCs to avoid knowledge loss. Originality/value This study described older adults’ unique characteristics when modeling their information and communication technologies-related behaviors and built two models to explain their KC/KS behaviors. It confirmed that the same factor has different levels of impact on older adults’ KC/KS behaviors in VCs. In addition, it confirmed and reinforced the complementary and substitutive effects of other MP as an environmental factor on these behaviors.

The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions

This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.