scholarly journals Causal Exclusion and Ontic Vagueness

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Kenneth Silver
Keyword(s):  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Ontic Vagueness

scholarly journals Experiments on causal exclusion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Blanchard ◽  
Dylan Murray ◽  
Tania Lombrozo
Keyword(s):  
Causal Exclusion

Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness

dialectica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-505
Author(s):  
Dwayne Moore
Keyword(s):  
Causal Exclusion

Determinables, Determinates, and Causal Relevance

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Walter
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Causal Relevance ◽  
Exclusion Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Mental Events ◽  
Manifest Image

Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical events unless mental causation is a genuine case of overdetermination or mental properties are straightforwardly reducible to physical properties.

scholarly journals Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baumgartner
Keyword(s):  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Master Argument ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
Causal Overdetermination ◽  
Exclusion Argument ◽  
Causal Closure

One of the central objectives Shapiro and Sober pursue in (2007) is to show that what they call the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is a type of causal exclusion argument, fails. Epiphe nomenalism, according to the terminology adopted in (Shapiro and Sober 2007), designates the thesis that supervening macro properties (or variables or factors) have no causal influence on micro proper ties that are caused by the micro supervenience bases of those macro properties. Well-known classical exclusion arguments are designed to yield such macro-tomicro epiphenomenalism along the lines of the following reasoning: subject to the widely accepted principle of the causal closure of the physical, there exists a causally sufficient micro cause for every micro effect; if it is additionally assumed that macro properties supervene on micro properties without being identical (or reducible) to the latter and if — in light of the rareness of cases of causal overdetermination — micro effects are assumed not to be systematically overdetermined, it follows that macro properties are causally inert with respect to effects of their micro supervenience bases.

scholarly journals Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 405-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Baltimore ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Causal Exclusion

scholarly journals Double Prevention and Mental Causation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Sean Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Exclusion Problem ◽  
Mental Events

<p>Double prevention is often mentioned in the causation literature but is not often discussed in depth. In this thesis my primary goal is to take a deep look at double prevention and evaluate one place it has been put to work. Briefly, a case of double prevention is a case where one event prevents another from preventing a third. While we have strong intuitions that such cases should be causally relevant at least, there is debate over whether they should be counted as fully causal. Sophie Gibb (2013) puts this concept to work by arguing that mental events act as double preventers to physical events. She frames this as an argument against the causal exclusion problem. I propose my own adaption of Gibb’s proposal which does not rest on the controversial premises the original does and as such has a wider appeal.</p>

scholarly journals Intervening in the Exclusion Argument

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Woodward
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Exclusion Argument

This chapter discusses Peter Menzies’ work on mental causation and the causal exclusion argument. It endorses Menzies’ claim that an interventionist account of causation can cast new light on this complex of issues, but diverges from Menzies’ position at several points, in particular in connection with the role of proportionality considerations in the characterization of causation. This chapter attempts to clarify Woodward’s views about mental causation and the exclusion argument, to respond to some recent criticisms of those views, and to contrast Woodward’s views with the somewhat different approach favored by Menzies. The differences between Woodward’s and Menzies’ views are traced in part to different assumptions about the semantics of counterfactuals.

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