scholarly journals Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism

2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baumgartner
Keyword(s):  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Master Argument ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
Causal Overdetermination ◽  
Exclusion Argument ◽  
Causal Closure

One of the central objectives Shapiro and Sober pursue in (2007) is to show that what they call the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is a type of causal exclusion argument, fails. Epiphe nomenalism, according to the terminology adopted in (Shapiro and Sober 2007), designates the thesis that supervening macro properties (or variables or factors) have no causal influence on micro proper ties that are caused by the micro supervenience bases of those macro properties. Well-known classical exclusion arguments are designed to yield such macro-tomicro epiphenomenalism along the lines of the following reasoning: subject to the widely accepted principle of the causal closure of the physical, there exists a causally sufficient micro cause for every micro effect; if it is additionally assumed that macro properties supervene on micro properties without being identical (or reducible) to the latter and if — in light of the rareness of cases of causal overdetermination — micro effects are assumed not to be systematically overdetermined, it follows that macro properties are causally inert with respect to effects of their micro supervenience bases.

scholarly journals Dualism, mental explanations and explanatory exclusion

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-45
Author(s):  
Janko Nesic
Keyword(s):  
Closure Problem ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Causal Overdetermination ◽  
Causal Closure

Kim?s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE) generates the problem of mental explanation for dualism. Gibb argues that Kim?s principle is metaphysically implausible, but shows that a weaker principle EE* generates a similar problem for interactive dualism. In this paper I examine a possible dualistic response to arguments from EE and EE*. It is shown that both arguments from EE and EE* rest on the premises of the argument from overdetermination - causal exclusion and causal closure. Problem of explanatory exclusion can be reduced to the problem of causal overdetermination. I will show how an interactive dualist can make a plausible response to the argument from EE by rejecting the argument from causal overdetermination.

Determinables, Determinates, and Causal Relevance

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Walter
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Causal Relevance ◽  
Exclusion Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Mental Events ◽  
Manifest Image

Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical events unless mental causation is a genuine case of overdetermination or mental properties are straightforwardly reducible to physical properties.

scholarly journals Intervening in the Exclusion Argument

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Woodward
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Exclusion Argument

This chapter discusses Peter Menzies’ work on mental causation and the causal exclusion argument. It endorses Menzies’ claim that an interventionist account of causation can cast new light on this complex of issues, but diverges from Menzies’ position at several points, in particular in connection with the role of proportionality considerations in the characterization of causation. This chapter attempts to clarify Woodward’s views about mental causation and the exclusion argument, to respond to some recent criticisms of those views, and to contrast Woodward’s views with the somewhat different approach favored by Menzies. The differences between Woodward’s and Menzies’ views are traced in part to different assumptions about the semantics of counterfactuals.

Three Versions of Physical Closure

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 640-658
Author(s):  
Lei Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Physical Effect ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Exclusion Argument ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Causal Closure

Abstract The Exclusion Argument has been regarded as the most powerful challenge to non-reductive physicalism. This argument presupposes a crucial thesis, Causal Closure of the Physical, which asserts that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Although this thesis is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophers say surprisingly little about what notion of physical entities should be adopted in the context. In this article, the author distinguishes between three versions of Closure that appeal to a narrow, a moderate, and a wide notion of the physical, respectively. The author then argues that none of the three versions can challenge non-reductive physicalism.

The Causal Exclusion Argument

2006 ◽  
Vol 131 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Kallestrup
Keyword(s):  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Exclusion Argument

Difference-making, Closure, and Exclusion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Weslake
Keyword(s):  
Mental Causation ◽  
Causal Exclusion ◽  
Difference Making ◽  
Exclusion Argument

This chapter discusses Peter Menzies’ work on mental causation and the causal exclusion argument. The author shares with Menzies the conviction that an interventionist account of causation can cast new light on this complex of issues, but his view diverges from Menzies at several points, including the role of proportionality considerations in the characterization of causation. This chapter seeks to clarify the role that proportionality considerations should play in the interventionist account of causation. The author develops a number of arguments for the claim that proportionality considerations belong not in the theory of causation but rather in the theory of explanatory value. These arguments help to situate the approach to mental causation favoured by Menzies in relation to the interventionist account of causation.

Could Mental Causation be Invisible?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Robb
Keyword(s):  
Human Physiology ◽  
Mental Causation ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Long Term Results ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
Empirical Prediction ◽  
Causal Closure ◽  
Mental Events

E. J. Lowe proposed a model of mental causation on which mental events are emergent, thus exerting a novel, downward causal influence on physical events. Yet on Lowe’s model, mental causation is at the same time empirically undetectable, and in this sense is ‘invisible’. Lowe’s model is ingenious, but I don’t think emergentists should welcome it, for it seems to me that a primary virtue of emergentism is its bold empirical prediction about the long-term results of human physiology. Here I’ll try to restore emergentism’s empirical status, but my broader aim is to use Lowe’s model to explore some central topics in the mental causation debate, including the ‘causal closure’ of the physical world and the nature of causal powers.

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