Causal topology and non-material causes

The principle of physical causal closure makes the problem of the ontology of consciousness insoluble since the principle rejects the possibility of mental causation. However, this principle is based on the linear causality model the foundation of which is the connection of material events with each other. The article deals with the possibility of mental causation based on non-material events, reflecting the influence of probability on probability, and not an event on an event. A hypothetical model is considered, in which one state of activity of neural processes in the brain can correspond to various mental states that differ from each other, however, not content-wise but within the framework of a non-material property. The non-material property is defined as the likelihood of mental assessments and, in essence, is the causal topology of mental processes.

No Good Arguments for Causal Closure

Many common arguments for physicalism begin with the principle that the cosmos is “causally closed.” But how good are the arguments for causal closure itself? I argue that the deductive, a priori arguments on behalf of causal closure tend to beg the question. The extant inductive arguments fare no better. They commit a sampling error or a non-sequitur, or else offer conclusions that remain compatible with causal openness. In short, we have no good arguments that the physical world is causally closed.

Three Versions of Physical Closure

The Exclusion Argument has been regarded as the most powerful challenge to non-reductive physicalism. This argument presupposes a crucial thesis, Causal Closure of the Physical, which asserts that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. Although this thesis is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of mind, philosophers say surprisingly little about what notion of physical entities should be adopted in the context. In this article, the author distinguishes between three versions of Closure that appeal to a narrow, a moderate, and a wide notion of the physical, respectively. The author then argues that none of the three versions can challenge non-reductive physicalism.

Problems with the "Problems" with Psychophysical Causation

In this essay, I defend a mind-body dualism, according to which human minds are immaterial substances that exercise non-redundant causal powers over bodies, against the notorious problem of psychophysical causation. I explicate and reply to three formulations of the problem: (i) the claim that, on dualism, psychophysical causation is inconsistent with physical causal closure, (ii) the claim that psychophysical causation on the dualist view is intolerably mysterious, and (iii) Jaegwon Kim’s claim that dualism fails to account for causal pairings. Ultimately, I conclude that these objections fail and that dualist interactionism is no more problematic or mysterious than physical causation.