Did James have an Ethics of Belief?

1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-297
Author(s):  
James C. S. Wernham
Keyword(s):  
Positive Answer ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Insufficient Evidence ◽  
Reasonable Suspicion ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

it is easy to think that he did. Clifford certainly had one. In a celebrated essay he argued for the thesis that “it is wrong always, everywhere and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence“; and his title was “The Ethics of Belief.” Clifford was not alone, for Huxley, also, was of that same opinion. For him, such belief was not just wrong: it was “the lowest depth of immorality.” With that opinion, and with those advocates of it, James was locked in a struggle throughout his life; and it is a reasonable suspicion that the opponent of one ethics of belief is himself an ethicist with a rival ethics of belief of his own. That suspicion, moreover, appears to be confirmed by James's best known essay. He himself came to the view that his The Will to Believe would have been better named The Right to Believe, and it is a commonplace that “right” is a word of the ethical vocabulary. In short, there are obvious signs pointing to a positive answer to our question.

Reasoning and Lapses in James’ The Will to Believe

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 387-399
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler
Keyword(s):  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Insufficient Evidence ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

James’ The Will to Believe is the most influential writing in the ethics of belief. In it, James defends the right and rationality to believe on non-evidential grounds. James’ argument is directed against Clifford’s “Evidentialism” presented in The Ethics of Belief in which Clifford concludes that “[i]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”. After an overview of the James-Clifford exchange and James’ argument, I reconstruct his argument in detail. Subsequently, I examine four steps in James’ argument, and try to show that these amount to fallacies – enticing to reason, but not cogent.

William James and the Ethics of Belief

Philosophy ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 58 (225) ◽  
pp. 353-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.L. Doore
Keyword(s):  
William James ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Main Principle ◽  
Insufficient Evidence ◽  
Widespread Agreement ◽  
The Will ◽  
American Style ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

There is widespread agreement among philosophers that William James's well-known attempt to justify religious faith in ‘The Will to Believe’ is a failure. But despite the fact that James wrote his essay as a reply to the ‘tough-minded’ ethics of belief represented by such thinkers as W. K. Clifford and T. H. Huxley, the reasons commonly given today for rejecting James's position seem to be mostly based on the same principle of intellectual ethics that motivated Clifford and Huxley. Clifford, it may be recalled, maintained that ‘It is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. Although this is a rather rhetorical way of stating it, the principle is basically the same one adhered to by most scientists and philosophers who consider themselves rigorous and ‘objective’ thinkers. Even philosophers not associated with the hardheaded modern Anglo-American style of empiricism commonly pledge their allegiance to such a principle. For example, Brand Blanshard (who is an epistemological idealist) holds that the ‘main principle’ of the ethics of belief is that one should ‘equate one's assent to the evidence’ and he then goes on to criticize James, on the basis of this principle, for advocating self-deception and intellectual dishonesty.

Newman and the ‘Ethics of Belief’

1983 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
John Henry Newman ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Insufficient Evidence ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

The last thirty years have seen a number of major contributions to the philosophical discussion of the possibility and character of an ‘ethics of belief’. In so far as the concern was focused on the problem of what constitutes ‘sufficient’ or ‘insufficient evidence’, the question of the ‘ethics of belief’ has turned into the current philosophical preoccupation with the question of the character of ‘rationality’ and the possibility of criteria of rationality which are either universal or at least cross-contextual. On the other hand, in so far as the concern was focused on the debated thesis that ‘believing is subject to moral appraisal (including the determination of “duties” to believe)’ the question of the ‘ethics of belief’ is with us today as the double inquiry into the question of the ‘will to believe’ and the relation of belief to action. Though the two concerns are not entirely separable, I will pay more explicit attention in this paper to the latter one in assessing some recent claims concerning the position held by John Henry Newman on these matters. After addressing some of the main points in the modern philosophical discussion of the ‘ethics of belief’, I will attempt to clarify Newman's place in the ‘ethics of belief’ discussion and argue that recent evaluations of Newman misrepresent his position in crucial ways and obscure his contributions to that discussion.

The Morality of Religious Belief

1985 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-557
Author(s):  
Clyde Nabe
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
William James ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

Van Harvey's The Historian and the Believer appeared nearly a century after W. K. Clifford's ‘The ethics of belief’. Harvey is critical of the epistemological supports of religious belief in a way strikingly similar to Clifford's criticisms. But Clifford's view did not go uncriticized in the intervening period. William James for instance used Clifford's essay as a foil for his argument in ‘The will to believe’. Now here is Clifford's argument again offered in twentieth century garb in Harvey's book. That a view so similar to Clifford's can arise again a century later, and after strong criticism, suggests that there is some important integrity to that view, and that that view strikes a responsive chord in the ear of many contemporary human beings. This paper intends therefore to examine Clifford's and Harvey's works in order to uncover what makes their shared view attractive.

James, Clifford, and the Scientific Conscience

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Hollinger
Keyword(s):  
New England ◽  
William James ◽  
Belief Systems ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

This chapter presents a comparative reading of W. K. Clifford's 1877 treatise, “The Ethics of Belief,” and William James' 1897 essay, “The Will to Believe.” It provides an interpretation of each in the distinctive contexts of England in the 1870s and New England in the 1890s. It argues that Clifford displayed more sensitivity than James did to the consequences of belief. This is an ironic reversal of roles in the story of a great pragmatist who insisted that “the whole defense of religious faith hinges upon” the action that faith requires or inspires. James' “The Will to Believe” should be understood not only as an artifact of its author's agony about the fate of Christianity in the age of science, but also as a product of his political complacency. Clifford had a much more modern understanding than James did of the function of belief systems in society and politics.

Listening to Clifford's Ghost

2009 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 15-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter van Inwagen
Keyword(s):  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Insufficient Evidence ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

The Clifford of my title is W. K. Clifford, who is perhaps best known as the exponent of a certain ethic of belief – an ethic of belief that he was probably the first to formulate explicitly and which no one has defended with greater eloquence or moral fervor. In the lecture called, appropriately enough, ‘The Ethics of Belief,’ Clifford summarized his ethic in a single, memorable sentence: ‘It is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. It will be convenient for us to have a name for this ethical thesis. I will call it ‘ethical evidentialism’ – ‘evidentialism’ for short.

Normative Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matti Eklund
Keyword(s):  
Positive Answer ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

What is it for a concept to be normative? Some possible answers are explored and rejected, among them that a concept is normative if it ascribes a normative property. The positive answer defended is that a concept is normative if it is in the right way associated with a normative use. Among issues discussed along the way are the nature of analyticity, and there being a notion of analyticity—what I call semantic analyticity—such that a statement can be analytic in this sense while failing to be true. Considerations regarding thick concepts and slurs are brought to bear on the issues that come up.

ON THE ETHICS OF BELIEF

Ratio ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-159
Author(s):  
Nicholas Nathan
Keyword(s):  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document