scholarly journals A Review of Scientific Progress in Flow in Sport and Exercise: Normal Science, Crisis, and a Progressive Shift

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Swann ◽  
David Piggott ◽  
Matthew Schweickle ◽  
Stewart A. Vella
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Knauff ◽  
Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda

For most its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary exten-sional logic. The “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief centre stage, often represented as probabilities. The term “new paradigm” refers to Thomas Kuhn’s popular theory of science, which describes scientific progress as discontinues process of alternating "normal" and "revolutionary" phases. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision on what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that before the new de-velopments, the psychology of reasoning was neither in a phase of normal science, nor is the alleged new paradigm as revolutionary as the term suggests. Based on this analysis, we argue that the supposed opposition between a “new” and “old” para-digms hinders progress in the field. A more productive view is that current progress is developing in continuities where rival research programs stimulate each other in a fruitful way. The article closes with some topics where further connections between competing research programs are likely to promote progress in the psychology of reasoning.


Author(s):  
Olga E. Stoliarova ◽  

What is cognitive (scientific) humility? Is it a virtue or vice? We consider the manifestations of cognitive humility highlighted by I.T. Kasavin, placing them in two contexts – normal science and revolutionary science. Such cognitive virtues as the search for justification, knowledge as confidence (knowledge through testimony), recognition of the limitations of knowledge, and selflessness can work to the benefit of both normal and revolutionary science. The victorious scientific paradigm retroactively justifies its creators, turning them into knights without fear and reproach. Accordingly, the losing scientific paradigm in many respects devalues the virtues of those who advocated it. We come to the conclu­sion that a positive or negative assessment of the facts of cognitive humility de­pends on our attitude to the “norm” and “revolution”, on our interpretation of progress. We also raise the question of whether the virtues of cognitive humility described by I.T. Kasavin can be attributed to T. Kuhn. From an outside histori­cal observer, Kun cannot be denied the cognitive virtues that Kasavin associates with normal science. Despite this, Kuhn made a revolution in socio-humanitarian thought and jointed the ranks of “revolutionary” scientists. This means that man­ifestations of cognitive humility fit as easily into the context of the “revolution” as into the context of the “norm” and are retrospectively evaluated both posi­tively and negatively depending on our preferences.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek

AbstractIf we want psychological science to have a meaningful real-world impact, it has to be trusted by the public. Scientific progress is noisy; accordingly, replications sometimes fail even for true findings. We need to communicate the acceptability of uncertainty to the public and our peers, to prevent psychology from being perceived as having nothing to say about reality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexa M. Tullett ◽  
Simine Vazire

AbstractWe contest the “building a wall” analogy of scientific progress. We argue that this analogy unfairly privileges original research (which is perceived as laying bricks and, therefore, constructive) over replication research (which is perceived as testing and removing bricks and, therefore, destructive). We propose an alternative analogy for scientific progress: solving a jigsaw puzzle.


1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (9) ◽  
pp. 650-650
Author(s):  
David Lavallee ◽  
Mark Nesti

1982 ◽  
Vol 27 (7) ◽  
pp. 548-548
Author(s):  
Victor A. Benassi
Keyword(s):  

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