scholarly journals The current case law of the European Court of Human Rights on privacy: challenges in the digital age

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-51
Author(s):  
Özgür Heval Çɪnar
Author(s):  
Andrew Yu. KLYUCHNIKOV

The article is devoted to the principle of the rule of law, implemented through the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. (Convention) by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The relevance of studying this principle is due to the new approach formed by the Court that the rule of law is “inherent in all articles of the Convention.” We can see its application in the current case-law of the Court as one of the fundamental elements of the independence of national courts. Thus, the author aims to identify the theoretical and practical aspects of the ECHR’s approach to the problem of judicial independence and legal application of the rule of law principle, to study the relevant Court practice. The rule of law and the independence of the judiciary as the basic elements of the convention system are an integral part of the institution of the “European public order” developed by the ECHR, therefore it is necessary to trace their interconnection. The case-law of the ECHR served as the material for the study, which allowed us to identify all stages of the formation of the rule of law principle and its actual “content”. Analyzing judicial practice, along with using doctrinal approaches, we managed to identify the limits of permissible application of national laws, the powers of bodies and officials of various branches of government, bodies of the judicial community to the given problem, new aspects of the status of judges seen as one of the democratic values of society. To achieve this, the author used methods specific to studies of law and general scientific (traditional) research methods, with an emphasis on comparative and general legal methods, and the method of induction during the analysis of judicial practice. The paper examines the normative sources of law and judicial practice of the ECHR, allowing to reveal the principle of the rule of law, its correlation with the principle of judicial independence, the specifics of its impact on the domestic national judicial system and the functioning of the state apparatus, to determine the role of the principle in the convention mechanism of the protection of human rights.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliya Samovich

The manual is devoted to making individual complaints to the European Court of human rights: peculiarities of realization of the right to appeal, conditions of admissibility and the judicial procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. The author analyses some “autonomous concepts” used in the court's case law and touches upon the possibility of limiting the right to judicial protection. The article deals with the formation and development of the individual's rights to international judicial protection, as well as the protection of human rights in universal quasi-judicial international bodies and regional judicial institutions of the European Union and the Organization of American States. This publication includes a material containing an analysis of recent changes in the legal regulation of the Institute of individual complaints. The manual is recommended for students of educational organizations of higher education, studying in the areas of bachelor's and master's degree “Jurisprudence”.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2014 ◽  
pp. 13-31
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Grzelak-Bach

Following a brief introduction of article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the author begins by analyzing case law from the European Court of Human Rights regarding the legal reasoning in judicial proceedings. The main premise of this paper is to present a formula for preparing legal reasoning in administrative court proceedings. The author draws attention to the role of judges who, in the process of adjudication, should apply creative interpretation of the rules of law, when they see errors or omissions in legislative provisions, or blatant violations of the European legal order. The conclusion of those deliberations finds, that the process of tailoring the approach to meet Strasbourg’s requirements should, on a basic level, be at the discretion of judges rather than the legislators.


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