The effect of bank governance on borrowers’ accounting choices

Author(s):  
Kang Sung Hur ◽  
in Tae Hwang
2008 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-426
Author(s):  
Z. Kudrna

This paper reviews the progress of banking reforms in China. Since 2002, the reform strategy has relied on publicly-financed bailouts, implementation of international best practices in bank governance and regulation, and listing of major banks in Hong Kong. The three largest banks have been stabilised, but we find little reason to expect this to be sustainable. Prudential indicators are comparable to international averages, but this is an outcome of bailouts and ongoing credit boom. Reforms of bank governance and regulatory frameworks that would alter banker’s incentives are implemented in a selective manner; principles that concentrate key powers in the centre are implemented vigorously, whereas those that require independent boards and regulators are ignored. Selectiveness of institutional reform means that the largest banks remain under state control and can be used as means of development policy for the better or the worse.


Author(s):  
Oya Altinkilic ◽  
Robert S. Hansen ◽  
Emir Hrnjic

2006 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank D. Hodge ◽  
Roger D. Martin ◽  
Jamie H. Pratt
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1553-1573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Kalyta

ABSTRACT: Empirical research on the impact of managerial retirement on discretionary accounting choices is inconclusive, with most studies finding no evidence of earnings management in the pre-retirement period. I argue that income-increasing accounting choices in final pre-retirement years are particularly appealing to managers whose pension depends on firm performance in these years. Using primary data on retired CEOs of Fortune 1000 firms, I investigate the impact of CEO pension plans on discretionary accruals. Consistent with the prediction, I find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in the pre-retirement period only when CEO pension is based on firm performance. I also report evidence of negative abnormal market reaction to CEO retirement in firms with performance-contingent CEO pensions.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reining Petacchi ◽  
Nolan Y. Kido ◽  
Joseph Peter Weber
Keyword(s):  

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