Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class‐Action Securities Litigation

2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Helland
2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 251-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Arena ◽  
Brandon Julio

AbstractThe risk of securities class action litigation alters corporate savings and investment policy. Firms with greater exposure to securities litigation hold significantly more cash in anticipation of future settlements and other related costs. The result is due to firms accumulating cash in anticipation of lawsuits and not a consequence of plaintiffs targeting firms with high cash levels. The market value of cash is lower for firms exposed to litigation risk. Corporate investment decisions are also affected by litigation risk, as firms reduce capital expenditures in response. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and possible spurious temporal effects.


2002 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry E. Cushing ◽  
David L. Gilbertson

It has been claimed that the accounting profession faces a serious litigation crisis, largely attributable to frivolous class-action lawsuits that allege securities fraud. In response to recent calls for research on accounting litigation, this paper develops and analyses a game-theoretic model of securities class-action litigation and settlement under present institutional arrangements in the United States. Two research questions are examined. First, what factors explain the outcomes of securities lawsuits against independent auditors in the U.S.? Second, what (if any) strategies exist that accounting firms might employ to deter unwarranted securities litigation, coerced settlements, and other objectionable outcomes? Our results indicate that (1) settlements are the predominant outcome of the securities litigation game because both sides generally receive higher expected payoffs from settlements than from trials; (2) the prevalence of protracted pre-trial litigation in securities lawsuits is primarily attributable to the method employed to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys; (3) the prevalence of settlement amounts that are generally a small proportion of claimed damages could result from strategic decisions by plaintiffs' attorneys, and hence does not necessarily indicate that securities lawsuits often have low merit as claimed by Arthur Andersen et al. (1992); and (4) effective strategies to deter securities litigation may be available to accounting firms, but effective implementation of these strategies may entail substantial short-run costs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-185
Author(s):  
Brian Elzweig

This Article examines Congress’s decades-long attempt to ensure that securities class action lawsuits of national importance are litigated in federal courts. The intent is limiting strike suits. Congress attempted to curtail strike suits through the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”). The PSLRA required heightened pleading requirements to ensure the validity of federal securities class actions. Instead of solving the dilemma, plaintiffs circumvented the PSLRA by bringing fraud cases as state law claims. To combat the circumvention of the PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”). SLUSA federally preempted state law claims based on alleged misrepresentations, untrue statements, or omissions of material facts, requiring them to be brought in federal court. However, SLUSA did not address the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the Securities Act of 1933. This created an anomaly whereby many federal claims under the 1933 Act were brought in state courts, while state fraud claims were required to be brought in federal court. Congress could have addressed this enigma when it enacted the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Instead, CAFA, which reformed class actions generally, exempted most securities class actions from its rules. In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Cyan v. Beaver County and allowed 1933 Act claims covered by SLUSA to continue to be brought in state courts. The Court was silent on non-covered securities. This Article recommends how Congress can accomplish its goal of forcing important securities class actions into federal courts.


Amicus Curiae ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-187
Author(s):  
Ding Chen

Private securities litigation has been very weak since the establishment of China’s stock market some 30 years ago. A new law on securities took effect in March 2020 and introduces some reformist changes to this area. This article will examine the likely effect of the new Securities Law on this form of litigation. In particular, it will examine China’s most celebrated ‘quasi-class action’ system, i.e. Special Representative Litigation. This procedure is borrowed from Taiwan’s non-profit organization model. The essay argues that, since the new Securities Law has made only limited efforts in addressing the primary reason for the weak private securities litigation, namely, lack of judicial independence, it is unlikely to make any significant changes to private securities litigation in China. Keywords: private securities litigation; securities law; class action; cost of litigation; judicial independence.


1983 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason R. Dura ◽  
Russ Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  

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