scholarly journals Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism

Author(s):  
Kenneth Kletzer ◽  
Jürgen Von Hagen
2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadine Richez-Battesti

This article seeks to analyze the social impacts of the Economic and Monetary Union and to reflect on the new modalities for producing social norms within this new context. First, after pointing out limits to the nominal convergence that the treaty stipulates for the interim phase, we mil present the new forms of adjustment pursuant to the EMU and their impacts on the welfare state. We will then turn to the responses of some economists to the introduction of a single currency and coordination of budgetary policies, including fiscal federalism. We will try to show the desirability of a European welfare state that would introduce some coherence between the different levels (local, national, Europe-wide) and forms (legislative and union-management) of social regulation ; in essence, a reworking of the idea of social subsidiarity.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar Belke

The Van Rompuy Report and also additional proposals made by the European Commission outlined steps for a 'genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. This article explains, assesses and comments on the proposals made. Moreover, it outlines what could be recommendations in order to achieve a 'genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. For this purpose, details of the Interim Report are systematically evaluated. We also deal with different governance visions emerging from the ongoing euro area crisis and starts from different views of the 'North and the South' of the euro area on this issue. This contribution argues that there is an alternative option to the notion of cooperative fiscal federalism involving fiscal union, bailouts and debt mutualisation: competition-based fiscal federalism accompanied by a properly defined banking union. In order to be a successful one, any deal will have to come up with a successful recipe of how to (re-)create trust between European citizens and their elected governments.


1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R Bean

The European Council's Maastricht Agreement maps out a precise route to monetary union and the eventual introduction of a common currency. My discussion begins with a look at the general arguments for and against monetary union. I shall then discuss the proposed constitution of the European Central Bank and whether it is likely to be conducive to monetary stability, together with some of the problems posed by the transition to the new regime. Finally, I will turn to the issue of rules for the conduct of fiscal policy and the question of “fiscal federalism.”


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