scholarly journals Integration of Formal Proof into Unified Assurance Cases - With Isabelle/SACM

ITNOW ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 66-66
Author(s):  
Simon Foster ◽  
Yakoub Nemouchi ◽  
Mario Gleirscher ◽  
Ran Wei ◽  
Tim Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Formal Methods ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Assurance Cases

Abstract The paper, by Simon Foster, Yakoub Nemouchi, Mario Gleirscher, Ran Wei and Tim Kelly, published in The Formal Aspects of Computing—Applicable Formal Methods (June 2021), explores the introduction of Isabelle/SACM into formal methods of assurance.

scholarly journals Integration of Formal Proof into Unified Assurance Cases with Isabelle/SACM

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Foster ◽  
Yakoub Nemouchi ◽  
Mario Gleirscher ◽  
Ran Wei ◽  
Tim Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Formal Methods ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Security Requirements ◽  
Computer Assisted ◽  
Critical Systems ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Functional Specification ◽  
Assurance Cases ◽  
Verification Techniques

AbstractAssurance cases are often required to certify critical systems. The use of formal methods in assurance can improve automation, increase confidence, and overcome errant reasoning. However, assurance cases can never be fully formalised, as the use of formal methods is contingent on models that are validated by informal processes. Consequently, assurance techniques should support both formal and informal artifacts, with explicated inferential links between them. In this paper, we contribute a formal machine-checked interactive language, called Isabelle/SACM, supporting the computer-assisted construction of assurance cases compliant with the OMG Structured Assurance Case Meta-Model. The use of Isabelle/SACM guarantees well-formedness, consistency, and traceability of assurance cases, and allows a tight integration of formal and informal evidence of various provenance. In particular, Isabelle brings a diverse range of automated verification techniques that can provide evidence. To validate our approach, we present a substantial case study based on the Tokeneer secure entry system benchmark. We embed its functional specification into Isabelle, verify its security requirements, and form a modular security case in Isabelle/SACM that combines the heterogeneous artifacts. We thus show that Isabelle is a suitable platform for critical systems assurance.

scholarly journals Towards Constraint-Solving over Higher-Order Unbounded Datatypes using Formal Methods Tools

10.29007/3rvf ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Leuschel
Keyword(s):  
Formal Methods ◽  
Constraint Satisfaction ◽  
Formal Method ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Constraint Satisfaction Problems ◽  
Constraint Solving ◽  
Future Improvement ◽  
High Assurance

We argue that formal methods such as B can be used to conveniently express a widerange of constraint satisfaction problems. We also show that some problems can be solvedquite eectively by existing formal methods tools such as Alloy or ProB. We illustrate ourclaim on several examples. Our approach is particularly interesting when a high assuranceof correctness is required. Indeed, validation and double checking of solutions is availablefor certain formal methods tools and formal proof can be applied to establish importantproperties or provide unambiguous semantics to problem specications. The experimentsalso provide interesting insights about the eectiveness of existing formal method tools,and highlight interesting avenues for future improvement.1

scholarly journals A Framework for Model and Verification of Safety-Critical Operating System Based on ARINC653

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 1934
Author(s):  
Wenjing Xu ◽  
Dianfu Ma
Keyword(s):  
Operating System ◽  
Formal Methods ◽  
Formal Proof ◽  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Critical System ◽  
Safety Critical ◽  
Safety Critical System ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
System Verification ◽  
Functional Correctness

As the scale and complexity of safety-critical software continue to grow, it is necessary to ensure safety and reliability to avoid minor errors leading to catastrophic disasters. Meantime, the traditional method, such as testing and simulation alone is insufficient to ensure the correctness of systems. This leads to using formal methods to provide sufficient evidence for systems. However, design a high assurance safety-critical system by formal methods is challenging due to the complexity of operating systems. In addition, the traditional interactive theorem prover used in system verification requires hand-written proofs, which are more expensive. Therefore, the efforts of providing a standardized formal framework as well as safety proofs, are notable for the develop a safety-critical system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a safety framework to establish a highly reliable and safety-critical operating system based on the ARINC653 standard, a multilevel and standardized formal model. To verify the functional correctness of this model, we propose a context-based formal proof method for programs. To achieve this goal, we first model 57 core services of ARINC653 and define the high-level requirements as pre-and post-conditions. Then, we construct a set of specification statements a formal axiom system transformed into logical sentences, and the core service model is transformed into a logical sentence sequence to be proved. Finally, a context-based formal proof system for specification correctness is developed. We have verified the correctness of safety-critical operating system core services with this system. Experience shows that the verification system we developed can be achieved the functional correctness of a complete OS with a low implement burden, and that can simplify the difficulty of automated verification and increase the degree of automation of proof.

Type Theory and Formal Proof

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob Nederpelt ◽  
Herman Geuvers
Keyword(s):  
Type Theory ◽  
Formal Proof
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