IV.—DISCUSSIONS: THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HEN

Mind ◽  
1942 ◽  
Vol LI (204) ◽  
pp. 368-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
RODERICK CHISHOLM
Keyword(s):  
Analysis ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 258-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tye
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
pp. 11-15
Author(s):  
Ákos Benk ◽  
Lajos Vidács

Our Faculty has been dealing with the cross-breeding of Hungarian speckled hen to maintain the breed since 1977. We keep two breeds of the Hungarian speckled hen, the bare-neck variant and the feathered-neck type on the pilot farm. Because of the spread of intensive poultry keeping the population of these breeds has become endangered. Beside the gene preservation, we endeavour to find the best way for the production-purposeutilisation of the speckled hen stock. We examined the egg production of these breeds.


1993 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Ralph Kennedy ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Analysis ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 422-426
Author(s):  
Xiaoxing Zhang

1971 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-243
Author(s):  
David M. Johnson
Keyword(s):  

Philosophers in the tradition of Berkeley say that the first step in gaining knowledge from perception is to report or describe one's perceptual data, or that which one sees (feels, hears, smells, tastes) ‘immediately'. Further, perceptual data (1) are existing things of some sort, and (2) always are exactly as they appear to be since, as H. H. Price says, “in the sphere of the given … what seems, is”. However, these two claims about perceptual data are sometimes incompatible, as the following case shows. Suppose a man looking at a speckled hen reports that it has many speckles but is not able to report the exact number of speckles it has. If (2) above is correct, the man's perceptual datum, as opposed to the physical hen itself which he sees—according to Berkeleians—in a merely indirect sense, would have to be indeterminate in character. Yet we assume that everything which exists (cf. requirement (1)) is and has to be completely determinate. A person's knowledge is indeterminate if he knows that the planet Mars has either two or three satellites and doesn't know which. But Mars itself at any moment has to have some definite number of satellites.


Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  

Chapter 11 defends the thesis that some phenomenal and epistemic conditions are luminous in the sense that you’re always in a position to know whether or not they obtain. Section 11.1 draws a distinction between epistemic and doxastic senses of luminosity and argues that some conditions are epistemically luminous even if none are doxastically luminous. Section 11.2 uses this distinction in solving Ernest Sosa’s version of the problem of the speckled hen. The same distinction is applied to Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument in section 11.3, his argument against epistemic iteration principles in section 11.4, and his argument for improbable knowing in section 11.5. Section 11.6 concludes by explaining why this defense of luminosity is not merely a pointless compromise.


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