D. Chalmers and J. Perry on Zombie Problem and the Content of Phenomenal Concepts

David Chalmers and John Perry both construe phenomenal concepts as irreducible to descriptive concepts of physical properties or properties, which logically supervene on them. But they draw different conclusions from this point. D. Chalmers in The Conscious Mind argues that the epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical properties shows that the former cannot be ontologically identified with the latter. J. Perry in Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness claims that we can identify phenomenal properties with physical ones without being committed to reductionism. In this paper I am going to examine Chalmers and Perrys views on meaning and necessity, especially with respect to identity statements, in order to find where exactly their ways of thinking about the content of phenomenal concepts.

Introspection, Adverbialism, and Rich Contents

The qualitative view is distinguished from sense-datum theories. Introspection is distinguished from attention. An account of sensory introspection is developed. A new theory of phenomenal concepts is outlined. The qualitative theory is compared with adverbialism and shown not to be subject to the same criticisms. The qualitative theory is shown to transform the debate about rich contents and allow a wide range of such contents.

Nonconceptualism as the key to a new physicalist strategy in the knowledge argument

This paper presents and defends an alternative version to the so-called strategy of phenomenal concepts (aka PCS) in defense of type B materialism in Jackson’s knowledge argument. Endorsing Ball and Tye’s criticism, I argue in favor of the following claims. First: Mary’s newly acquired content is nonconceptual in the light of all available criteria. Second: Mary’s acquisition of such content is precisely what allows us to explain, at least in part, both her epistemic progress (once released from her confinement) and the increase in her expertize regarding her old PHENOMENAL RED. However, although the acquisition of such nonconceptual content is indispensable, it is sufficient to explain Mary’s epistemic progress. Third: assuming that concepts are mental files, after undergoing the visual experiences of red for the first time, such newly acquired nonconceptual content goes through a process of “digitization” so that it can be stored in the mental file PHENOMENAL RED. Fourth and final claim: it is based on this concept of PHENOMENAL RED, now phenomenally enriched by the newly acquired nonconceptual content, that Mary is able to identify introspectively the phenomenal red of her new experience.

Reactive Concepts

This chapter recommends that we consider a kind of concept which bears a relation like the one traditional accounts of concepts bear to beliefs, but instead bears it to states individuated not only by their causal inputs, but also by their direct causal outputs. They will be called reactive representations, RRs for short. They are partially representational states which are reactive inasmuch as they bypass interaction with distinct desires to directly motivate behaviour. Associated with these representations are abilities that will be called Reactive Concepts. The chapter argues that taxonomizing mental states this way casts light on the nature of a range of phenomena, including hate speech, crypto-evaluative terms, and phenomenal concepts.

The explanatory gap problem and Papineau’s phenomenal concepts strategy

The main purpose of this article is to analyze David Papineau?s influential perceptual model of phenomenal concepts in order to respond to the explanatory gap problem. Those are special kind of concepts which we use to refere to phenomenal properties of our own experience. Such concepts are formed when the subjects initially perceive relevant entities, they get stored into memory, and become re-activated at each coming encounter. Their distinctive feature is the non-existence of a priori connection with other concepts we possess. When we think in non-phenomenal concepts we do not have the same feeling as when we think in phenomenal concepts. This is the cause of our assumption that feelings are somehow different than physical properties. This situation of two different modes of presentation of the same entity which develop the illusion of two different entities Papineau calls the antipathetic fallacy: It is the source of the dualist intuitions which encourage the impression of an explanatory gap and lead us to persistently reject the identity of mental and physical. Once we grasp the structure of phenomenal concepts we will understand the origin of those intuitions as well as the fact that they do not give us enough reasons for doubt in physicalism.

Explaining the “hard” problem

This chapter shows that global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. It shows how globally broadcast nonconceptual content enables higher-order thoughts about that content, where those thoughts can lack conceptual connections with physical, functional, or representational facts. As a result, zombies are conceivable and an (epistemic) explanatory gap is opened up. But the thoughts in question can themselves be given a fully naturalistic explanation. Hence all of the facts involved in consciousness can be fully explained. The chapter defends the reality of the phenomenal concepts needed to make this account work, and replies to a dilemma for the account proposed by David Chalmers.