Concluding Discussion

2019 ◽  
pp. 201-210
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 49-52 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering her account of the relation between intentional and voluntary action. Following this, the chapter considers Anscombe’s closing treatment of the concept of intention for the future, emphasizing her view that intention is expressed in a statement about what is going to happen, and considering how her discussion of this position mirrors elements in Wittgenstein’s discussion of Moore’s paradox.

Analysis ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. N. Williams

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park

Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers ask questions to their students to check whether they have grasped the content of a scientific theory. If the students are antirealists, they are also caught in Moore’s paradox when they respond positively to their teachers’ questions, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Finally, neither teachers nor students can understand phenomena in terms of scientific theories, if they are antirealists.


Author(s):  
Catherine Z. Elgin

Fallibilism with respect to knowledge is vulnerable to either a version of Moore’s paradox or to Kripke’s dogmatism paradox. Fallibilism with respect to understanding is not. The recognition of the perennial possibility of error advances understanding by sensitizing thinkers to exactly where and how they might be wrong. Thus the capacity to make mistakes is an epistemic achievement rather than a failing.


Symposion ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Michael Campbell ◽  

Theoria ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-47
Author(s):  
John N. Williams

Analysis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. M. Rosenthal

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