Knowledge without Observation

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 28–32 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by relating Anscombe’s thesis that intentional action is known without observation to Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Blue Book of the knowledge of oneself “as subject” and Anscombe’s discussion in “The First Person” of unmediated self-knowledge. Following this, the chapter explores the difficulties that herself Anscombe raises for her thesis, and considers her reasons for thinking that the scope of an agent’s non-observational self-knowledge is not limited to her interior states or immediate bodily movements. Finally, it considers how the difficulties that Anscombe has raised are supposed to be addressed by her discussion of how descriptions of one’s intentional action can be contradicted, and of the difference between a list that has the role of an order and one whose role is to provide an accurate description of some facts.

Practical Knowledge

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 44-48 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by situating her appeal to the concept of practical knowledge in relation to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Following this, the chapter shows how several elements in Aquinas’ account are drawn on by Anscombe in her argument that an agent’s self-knowledge of her act is “the cause of what it understands”. It is argued that Anscombe meant to characterize an agent’s practical knowledge as both formal and efficient cause of its object. Finally, the chapter considers whether Anscombe succeeds in defending her thesis that intentional action is necessarily known without observation. Here it is argued, first, that knowledge of one’s act is not a strict requirement of doing something intentionally, and second, that the role of observation in an agent’s self-knowledge is different from that of evidence in observational knowledge of the world.

The Unity of Action

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 19-27 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering Anscombe’s arguments that action is not intentional because of an “extra feature” of the agent, and that the concept of intentional action, as something to which a special sense of “Why?” can be given application, depends on the possibility of expressing intention for the future and describing one’s further intentions in acting. The chapter then considers Anscombe’s treatment of these last two concepts, showing how they yield a rich account of action as a teleological unity. Consideration is paid to the difference between Anscombe’s account of the unity of action and that of Donald Davidson. Finally, Anscombe’s account of the distinction between intention and foresight is discussed, with particular attention to the way that foreseen consequences stand in a different relation of dependency to an action than things that a person brings about intentionally.

Preliminaries

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 1-4 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. Attention is paid to the “three headings” under which she introduces her topic: expression of intention, intentional action, and intention in acting; and then to her preliminary discussion of expression of intention. Important concepts that are discussed in this chapter include the relation between the expression of intention and prediction, the question of what is described in expressing an intention, the difference between how expressions of intention and estimates of the future are grounded or justified, and the way that expressions of intention set the standard of correctness for the events that they describe. The chapter also explores Anscombe’s reasons for considering the topic of intentional action before attempting to characterize intention as an inner state of mind.

Practical Reasoning

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 33-43 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by presenting Anscombe’s argument that the premises in a practical syllogism, i.e. the considerations from which a person reasons in deciding what she will do, are not supposed to provide a proof of the conclusion that is drawn from them. Close attention is paid to the difference between Anscombe’s position and that of R.M. Hare, and several objections to her argument are considered. Following this, the chapter explores Anscombe’s Aristotelian account of practical reasoning as a way of calculating means to an end. The chapter also discusses the role of desire in practical reasoning, the thesis that desire for an object involves seeing it “under the aspect of some good”, and Anscombe’s argument that a practical syllogism represents a means–end order that is present in action itself.

Concluding Discussion

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 49-52 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering her account of the relation between intentional and voluntary action. Following this, the chapter considers Anscombe’s closing treatment of the concept of intention for the future, emphasizing her view that intention is expressed in a statement about what is going to happen, and considering how her discussion of this position mirrors elements in Wittgenstein’s discussion of Moore’s paradox.

Beginnings of an Account

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 5-18 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering Anscombe’s reasons for defining the concept of intentional action according to “a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’”. Following this, the chapter considers Anscombe’s discussion of several ways that this question can be refused application, each of which leads her to introduce a necessary condition of intentional action. Important concepts that are discussed in this chapter include those of knowledge without observation, mental causality, motive, and the relation between causes and reasons for acting. Anscombe’s account of these matters is contrasted in several places with that of Gilbert Ryle, and it is argued, contrary to Donald Davidson, that Anscombe was not in fact an “anti-causalist” about action explanation. The chapter also considers the possibility of doing something intentionally but “for no reason”, or for reasons that one cannot easily identify or express.