Marching on to Savannah, September–December 1864

This chapter studies the taking of Savannah in 1864. William T. Sherman, the author of the most famous and reviled of American campaigns, here relied entirely on himself. The scheme had been his, he had persuaded his skeptical chiefs to allow him to carry it out, and in doing so, he had taken a strategic gamble in Tennessee. Yet he had brought it off with aplomb. Moral opprobrium was often lavished, especially on the March to the Sea. Much of it is rooted in “the lies” of Confederate propagandists in the very final struggle for the moral high ground in waging this war. Many southern voices can be found in the sources expressing surprise at how well they were treated. However, Sherman’s style of war was far from novel. If we accept the centrality of plunder as a motive for taking part in war, then it follows that the southern pleading concerning the unique horrors to which they were subjected should be rejected. The criticism directed at Sherman is too personalized, as if he bears personal responsibility for every burning and act of vandalism. He has assumed a wholly false diabolic presence in this self-indulgent and self-serving folklore of victimhood. Indeed, the behavior of Sherman’s soldiers differs little from that of Union and Confederate troops on other fronts.