First Contact, March–May 1864

This chapter details how the year 1864 allowed William T. Sherman to operate for the first time not as a subordinate commander but as director of a series of armies in the field. His contribution to overall Union strategy would be significant and thus he began to exercise command at the level military analysts currently refer to as the operational level of war. Such a level links tactics and methods of fighting with strategy, in the overall scheme. It defines the manner in which armies organize in discrete campaigns and seek to fulfill the object of strategy by winning victories. Sherman’s performance overall needs to be considered by taking all aspects into account. As he began to work at the higher levels of the military art, he began to change the way in which people think and talk about war, and he propounded an individual philosophy of war. The higher he progressed, the more Sherman could not avoid confronting the harsh realities of political life, for his campaigns increasingly had an impact not just on American political discourse but indeed in 1864 on the outcome of the presidential election. Sherman expressed clear-cut political views and expounded them perhaps too forcefully. This complex mix worked as a catalyst in developing his ideas about war and his ability to put them into practice.

Departmental Commander—And Disaster

This chapter addresses the impact of the First Battle of Bull Run on William T. Sherman. On July 21, 1861, Sherman’s brigade had endured the hardest fighting. His superior officers believed that he had done well; on August 3, he received notification that he would be promoted to brigadier general of volunteers. This state of affairs would shortly change. Sherman might have witnessed his men’s foolhardy courage, but he found little else to praise in their conduct. The root of the problem lay in chronic indiscipline. Of greater interest is Sherman’s opinion of the Confederacy, as this would shape his analysis of the war’s conduct for the next six months. The experience of the First Battle of Bull Run, in his opinion, had revealed that the Confederates enjoyed significant tactical virtues. The chapter then details how Sherman suffered from adjustment disorder due to the Bull Run. On December 23, Major General Henry W. Halleck appointed Sherman to Benton Barracks, where he could train recruits and begin the resuscitation of his military career.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter explores William T. Sherman’s significant legacy of achievement. Several of his achievements are not controversial; two of them are indisputable. First, Sherman ranks alongside Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant as one of the three prime architects of Union victory in the Civil War. He thus played a major role in restoring the Union and setting the United States on the path to global pre-eminence: a goal that could be glimpsed in 1891. Secondly, though Sherman’s most resounding acts occurred during the Civil War, he achieved significant things afterwards, the most notable being his connection with the “winning” of the West and his identification with it. The chapter then considers Sherman’s style of warfare, looking at the three levels of military activity: tactical, operational, and strategy.

Commanding General of the Army, 1869–1884

This chapter recounts that on November 7, 1868, Ulysses S. Grant gained election to the presidency, leading to William T. Sherman succeeding him as general-in-chief. Throughout, Sherman had abstained from political activities, but he did express enthusiasm for Grant’s win. He also made early preparations for the move to Washington. Before Grant and Sherman’s ascents to greater responsibility, they were able to enjoy one last wartime swansong with 2000 former comrades at a joint reunion of the societies of the Armies of the Cumberland, Georgia, the Ohio, and the Tennessee in Chicago on December 15–16, 1868. At the meeting, Grant and Sherman discussed the future structure of the army. Grant assured Sherman that he intended to make the arrangements that he had introduced as general-in-chief permanent. The long duel between the commanding general and secretary of war waged since 1836 over who should direct the army would be finally decided in favor of the general-in-chief. On the same day of Grant’s inauguration, he sent to the Senate his nomination of Sherman in the rank of General of the Army of the United States. The following day, John M. Schofield issued the executive order stipulating that Sherman would succeed as commanding general.

Slogging on to Atlanta, July–September 1864

This chapter focuses on the Battle of Atlanta in 1864. Far from halting William T. Sherman’s progress, the Battle of Atlanta was in reality a series of tactical successes and in total an operational triumph. Sherman’s campaign demonstrated the value of an offensive strategy and operational plan combined with defensive tactics—notably in trench warfare. He had not set out to mount operations of this kind, but he had quickly grasped how such a combination aided his purpose. He exploited the tactical defensive so that he might take greater operational risks. What Sherman wanted to avoid were fruitless attacks on Atlanta’s defenses or being repulsed in the field; by this date, a setback of any order might not only endanger the integrity of his armies but would certainly seal the doom of the Lincoln administration. Ultimately, Sherman’s capture of the city was his single biggest success and illustrates the intersection of military and political events at this stage of the Civil War.

Leaping the Mark

This chapter discusses how, almost from the moment he graduated, William T. Sherman came under pressure to think about leaving the Army. When asked why he did not resign, he gave a forthright answer in 1842: “Why should I? It is the profession for which my education alone fits me, and as all the appearances indicate the rapid approach of action when the soldier will be required to do his proper labor, when a splendid field will be spread before him, every reason exists why I should remain.” The “action” Sherman referred to was the Second Seminole War (1835–42) in Florida. Sherman’s posting to Fort Pierce threw him into his first taste of warfare. He very quickly grasped the nature of this war and the Seminole tactics that had defied the best military minds in America. In June of 1842, the Regiment found itself on the move again, posted to Fort Moultrie, Charleston, South Carolina. Sherman’s main duty consisted of appearing in court martials, as his grasp of military law impressed all. While clinging to the profession he liked best, he developed two attitudes that underwrote his army life. The first concerned party politics, while the second matter involved religion. Both these qualities would be needed by a successful attorney. Yet he remained an army officer and these studies became an important part of his continuing military education.

Marching to Victory, December 1864–April 1865

This chapter describes William T. Sherman’s approach march to Fort McAllister. The March to the Sea might be over, but Sherman had not yet reached the sea. He had managed to cross the Ogeechee River thanks to the reconstruction of King’s Bridge, but he still faced two problems. First, he needed to make contact with the Union fleet. Second, he still needed to seize Savannah, a risky operation that needed to be completed swiftly. It is true that Sherman encountered weak opposition and that the March had not pulled significant Confederate reinforcements to Savannah. Nonetheless, Sherman lacked the equipment for a prolonged siege and might yet be seriously embarrassed. The fall of Fort McAllister permitted Sherman to concentrate his energies on establishing contact with the US Navy. Once contact with the US Navy had been firmly established, it brought some unexpected pleasures. The chapter then looks at the interactions between Sherman and the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton.

Marching on to Savannah, September–December 1864

This chapter studies the taking of Savannah in 1864. William T. Sherman, the author of the most famous and reviled of American campaigns, here relied entirely on himself. The scheme had been his, he had persuaded his skeptical chiefs to allow him to carry it out, and in doing so, he had taken a strategic gamble in Tennessee. Yet he had brought it off with aplomb. Moral opprobrium was often lavished, especially on the March to the Sea. Much of it is rooted in “the lies” of Confederate propagandists in the very final struggle for the moral high ground in waging this war. Many southern voices can be found in the sources expressing surprise at how well they were treated. However, Sherman’s style of war was far from novel. If we accept the centrality of plunder as a motive for taking part in war, then it follows that the southern pleading concerning the unique horrors to which they were subjected should be rejected. The criticism directed at Sherman is too personalized, as if he bears personal responsibility for every burning and act of vandalism. He has assumed a wholly false diabolic presence in this self-indulgent and self-serving folklore of victimhood. Indeed, the behavior of Sherman’s soldiers differs little from that of Union and Confederate troops on other fronts.

From Corps Command to Army Command

This chapter examines William T. Sherman’s experience of being an army commander in 1863. Sherman had never formally been anything other than a corps commander, though a “wing” of the Army of the Tennessee had been temporarily entrusted to his care. He had gained experience at high command and he put this to good use. To Sherman, the triumph of Vicksburg, including all the successes notched up since Arkansas Post, represented “the first gleam of daylight in this war.” All of his biographers agree that it represents an important learning experience for this commander. But this experience must be set within the context of the disappointments of the First Vicksburg Campaign. They distorted Sherman’s judgment and account for the development of Sherman’s essentially cautious outlook, mainly a product of the great distances that need to be traversed in this theater.

Divisional Commander, January–July 1862

This chapter recounts how, in February of 1862, after a surfeit of disappointment and humiliation, William T. Sherman received the revivifying news that he would command a division. He threw himself into the task of bringing order, cohesion, and discipline to his division. His staff played an important role in his success, as it oversaw the commander’s orders, although some time would elapse before a cohesive team emerged. The chapter then describes the great Battle of Shiloh, which erupted on April 6. Sherman’s conduct at Shiloh earned much praise. He might appear quirky, even eccentric, nervous, and highly-strung in daily affairs, but under fire he became cool, calculating, forthright, and decisive. Indeed, Sherman’s determination to hold back the tide of the Confederate onslaught, tactical insight, overall appreciation of the battle, willingness to assume responsibility, and empathy with the problems of other divisional commanders made an enormous contribution to the Union success at Shiloh.