The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View

2019 ◽  
pp. 55-75
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Priority View

According to the No-Priority View (NPV), what it is to be a reason for a pro-attitude cannot be analysed in terms of value but neither can what it is to be good or of value be analysed in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes. NPV has been defended by Jonathan Dancy and W. D. Ross. This chapter argues that there are several reasons to accept the buck-passing account of value (BPA) over NPV. First, BPA explains striking correlations between reasons and value that NPV does not. Second, BPA explains why value does not give non-derivative reasons to have pro-attitudes; NPV cannot do this. Third, BPA is more qualitatively parsimonious than NPV, and, as explained in this chapter, there are strong reasons to prefer more to less qualitatively parsimonious theories. Fourth, BPA explains why similar theoretical debates arise about reasons and value; NPV cannot do this. Fifth, BPA is more informative than NPV.

Not Sufficiently Neutral?

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
First Order ◽  
Buck Passing

Jonathan Dancy, Ulrike Heuer, Jonas Olson, and others have argued that there is reason to reject the buck-passing account of value (BPA) because of its implications for first-order normative ethics. Dancy argues that BPA is inconsistent with certain deontological views. Olson argues that BPA is inconsistent with an attractive way of distinguishing between consequentialism and deontology. Heuer argues that it begs the question against Williams’s internalism about reasons. This chapter argues that Dancy, Olson, and Heuer are mistaken. Others claim that certain versions of BPA are inconsistent with a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes there are. This chapter argues that even global consequentialism should not involve a consequentialist view about the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are and because of this it is not a problem for BPA that it is inconsistent with a consequentialist view of the reasons for pro-attitudes that there are.

Too Little Value?

2019 ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Rational Agents ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
Buck Passing

According to the Buck-Passing Account (BPA), for X to be good is for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. Suppose that there are birds that are in a great amount of pleasure in a world where there are no past, present, or future rational agents. There are no reasons for any agents to have pro-attitudes towards the birds’ pleasure, so BPA entails that their pleasure is not valuable, but it is valuable. So, BPA produces too little value. This is a problem for BPA and fitting-attitude accounts of value that has been raised and discussed by Krister Bykvist, Jonathan Dancy, and Andrew Reisner. This chapter motivates and defends two responses to this too little value problem: 1. The trans-world reasons response, according to which the birds’ pleasure is valuable because there are reasons for beings in other worlds to have pro-attitudes towards it; 2. The counterfactual response, according to which the birds’ pleasure is valuable because there would be reasons for agents to have pro-attitudes towards it if they were around.

Reasons as The Unity among the Varieties of Goodness

2019 ◽  
pp. 76-100
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
Prudential Value ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Priority View

The Buck-Passing Account of Value (BPA) analyses goodness simpliciter in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes. The Value-First Account (VFA) analyses reasons for pro-attitudes in terms of value. And the No-Priority View (NPV) holds that neither reasons nor value can be analysed in terms of one another. This chapter argues that BPA should be accepted rather than VFA or NPV because if BPA is accepted, then what all the different varieties of goodness have in common can be explained: but if VFA or NPV is accepted, what the different varieties of goodness have in common cannot be explained. In making this argument this chapter motivates and defends accounts of goodness for (prudential value) and goodness of a kind (attributive goodness) in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes. It shows that the objections that have been made to buck-passing accounts of goodness for and goodness of a kind can be overcome and that there are many advantages to accepting such accounts.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Richard Rowland
Keyword(s):  
The Third ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Priority View

This chapter introduces the buck-passing account of value and explains the structure of this book in which the account is motivated, defended, and extended. The buck-passing account analyses value in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes. This chapter explains the notion of a reason for a pro-attitude and its component parts, as well as the types of goodness and value that the buck-passing account is an account of. It then sketches several motivations for accepting the buck-passing account rather than its two competitors: the value-first account of reasons for pro-attitudes and the no-priority view. This chapter further clarifies how various distinctions in value can be made according to the buck-passing account and explores whether the buck-passing account is a metaphysical or conceptual thesis. This chapter maps out the structure of the first two parts of the book and explains how the buck-passing account will be extended to provide a reasons-first account of morality, fittingness, ought, and all of practical normativity in the third part of the book.

The Why-Be-Rational Challenge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Keyword(s):  
Structural Requirements ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rational Requirements ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Apparent Reasons

Besides the problems with detachment, proponents of the view that structural requirements of rationality are normative face the challenge to identify a reason that counts in favour of conforming to rational requirements. There are three possible ways to account for this challenge. The first is to present instrumental or other derivative reasons to conform to rational requirements (5.1). The second is to argue that rational requirements are themselves reasons (5.2). The third is to give some kind of buck-passing account of rational requirements, according to which such requirements are verdictive statements about reasons that exist independently of them (5.3–5.4). Chapter 5 argues that none of these strategies succeed. Finally, two accounts that have claimed to explain the normativity of structural rationality without assuming that rational requirements are necessarily accompanied by reasons, are discussed and rejected: the transparency account (5.5), and the apparent reasons account (5.6).

The Priority View Bites the Dust?

Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW WILLIAMS
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Conflicts ◽  
Priority View

This article distinguishes between a telic and a deontic version of Derek Parfit's influential Priority View. Employing the distinction, it shows that the existence of variations in how intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts should be resolved fails to provide a compelling case in favour of relational egalitarianism and against all pure versions of the Priority View. In addition, the article argues that those variations are better understood as providing counterevidence to certain distribution-sensitive versions of consequentialism.

Excellence and Means: On the Limits of Buck-Passing

2008 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Brännmark
Keyword(s):  
Buck Passing

scholarly journals Multiple Accountabilities Disorder dalam Kajian Penganggaran Hibah dan Bantuan Sosial Kota Surakarta

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 47
Author(s):  
Yuliana Kusuma Dewi ◽  
Herwan Parwiyanto
Keyword(s):  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Target Group ◽  
Buck Passing

<p>Penganggaran senantiasa dihiasi oleh kontestasi kepentingan dari aktor-aktor yang terlibat sehinga memicu patologi akuntabilitas anggaran. Organisasi dalam melakukan pertanggungjawaban mengalami konflik ekspektasi dari tuntutan aktor-aktor dalam penganggaran (<em>Multiple Accountabilities Disorder</em>). Artikel ini bertujuan  menganalisis fenomena <em>MAD</em> dalam kajian penganggaran dana hibah dan bantuan sosial. Teori <em>Multiple Accountabilities Disorder</em> menginduk dari Jonathan GS Koppel (2005), dengan dimensi <em>transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility,</em> dan <em>responsiveness</em>. Kajian analisis menggunakan sudut pandang administrasi dengan fokus analisis politik anggaran dalam konflik akuntabilitas. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan gejala patologi akuntabilitas anggaran <em>buck passing</em>, <em>Antrophy of Personal Responsibility </em>dan MAD. Diindikasikan dari adanya penyelewengan dan kasus korupsi dana hibah dan bantuan sosial di Sukararta. Patologi MAD dalam penganggaran hibah dan bansos terindikasi dari konflik ekpektasi antara dimensi <em>controllability, responsibility,</em> dan <em>responsiveness. </em>Berdasarkan hasil kajian, penganggaran hibah dan bansos perlu disertai monitoring-evaluasi berbasis <em>outcome</em> dan pendampingan berpastisipasi kelurahan-kecamatan sebagai upaya memperkecil peluang penyelewengan pada <em>target group</em>.</p><p><strong>Kata kunci:</strong> <strong>akuntabilitas, bantuan sosial, hibah, <em>multiple accountabilites   disorder, </em>penganggaran.</strong></p>

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