Disagreement and Religion: Problems and Prospects

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Benton
Keyword(s):  
Religious Diversity ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Divine Hiddenness ◽  
Epistemic Humility ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Normative Issues ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Chapter 1 covers contemporary work on disagreement, detailing both the conceptual and normative issues in play in the debates in mainstream analytic epistemology, and how these relate to religious diversity and disagreement. Section 1 examines several sorts of disagreement, and considers several epistemological issues: in particular, what range of attitudes a body of evidence can support, how to understand higher-order evidence, and who counts as an epistemic “peer.” Section 2 considers how these questions surface when considering disagreements over religion, including debates over the nature of evidence and truth in religion, epistemic humility, concerns about irrelevant influences and about divine hiddenness, and arguments over exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Finally, section 3 summarizes the contributors’ essays in this volume.

Higher-Order Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-344
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
Level Splitting ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports, then your total evidence can make it rationally permissible to be epistemically akratic. Section 10.1 presents the puzzle and three options for solving it: Level Splitting, Downward Push, and Upward Push. Section 10.2 argues that we should opt for Upward Push: you cannot have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence is or what it supports. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 defend Upward Push against David Christensen’s objection that it licenses irrational forms of dogmatism in ideal and nonideal agents alike. Section 10.5 responds to his argument that misleading higher-order evidence generates rational dilemmas in which you’re guaranteed to violate one of the ideals of epistemic rationality. Section 10.6 concludes with some general reflections on the nature of epistemic rationality and the role of epistemic idealization.

Can Your Total Evidence Mislead About Itself?

2019 ◽  
pp. 298-316
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Simple Mathematical Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

It’s fairly uncontroversial that you can sometimes get misleading higher-order evidence about what your first-order evidence supports. What is more controversial is whether this can result in a situation where your total evidence is misleading about what your total evidence supports: that is, where your total evidence is misleading about itself. It’s hard to arbitrate on purely intuitive grounds whether any particular example of misleading higher-order evidence is an example of misleading total evidence. This chapter tries to make progress by offering a simple mathematical model that suggests that higher-order evidence will tend to bear more strongly on higher-order propositions about what one’s evidence supports than it does on the corresponding first-order propositions; and then by arguing that given this, it is plausible that there will be some cases of misleading total evidence.

scholarly journals No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
NEIL LEVY
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Disadvantaged Groups ◽  
Intellectual Autonomy ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

AbstractNo-platforming—the refusal to allow those who espouse views seen as inflammatory the opportunity to speak in certain forums—is very controversial. Proponents typically cite the possibility of harms to disadvantaged groups and, sometimes, epistemically paternalistic considerations. Opponents invoke the value of free speech and respect for intellectual autonomy in favor of more open speech, arguing that the harms that might arise from bad speech are best addressed by rebuttal, not silencing. In this article, I argue that there is a powerful consideration in favor of no-platforming some speakers: allowing them a platform generates genuine higher-order evidence in favor of their claims. When that higher-order evidence would be misleading, we may reasonably believe it should not be generated.

Higher-Order Evidence

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Critical Survey ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Abstract A critical survey of recent work in epistemology on higher-order evidence. It discusses the nature of higher-order evidence, some puzzles it raises, responses to those puzzles, and problems facing them. It concludes by indicating connections between debates concerning higher-order evidence in epistemology and parallel debates in ethics and aesthetics.

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