Disagreement and Religion: Problems and Prospects

Chapter 1 covers contemporary work on disagreement, detailing both the conceptual and normative issues in play in the debates in mainstream analytic epistemology, and how these relate to religious diversity and disagreement. Section 1 examines several sorts of disagreement, and considers several epistemological issues: in particular, what range of attitudes a body of evidence can support, how to understand higher-order evidence, and who counts as an epistemic “peer.” Section 2 considers how these questions surface when considering disagreements over religion, including debates over the nature of evidence and truth in religion, epistemic humility, concerns about irrelevant influences and about divine hiddenness, and arguments over exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Finally, section 3 summarizes the contributors’ essays in this volume.

Democracy

Democracy is a term that is used to denote a variety of distinct objects and ideas. Democracy describes either a set of political institutions or an ideal of collective self-rule. Democracy can also be short for a normative principle of either legitimacy or justice. Finally, democracy might be used to denote an egalitarian attitude. These four uses of the term should be kept distinct and raises separate conceptual and normative issues. The value of democracy, whether democratic political institutions or democratic self-rule, is either instrumental, non-instrumental, or both. The non-instrumental value of democracy derives either from the alleged fairness of majority rule or from the value of the social relationships enabled by participation in democratic procedures. The instrumental value of democracy lends support from a growing body of empirical research. Yet, the claim that democracy has a positive causal effect on public goods is inconclusive with respect to the moral justification of democratic institutions. Normative reasons for democracy’s instrumental value must instead appeal to the fact that it contributes to equality, liberty, truth, or the realization of popular will. Democracy as a principle of either political legitimacy or justice is a normative view that evades concerns with the definition and value of democracy. Normative democracy is a claim about the conditions either for legitimacy or justice of either public authority or coercion. Debates in normative democracy are largely divorced from the conceptual and empirical concerns that inform studies of democracy elsewhere. The boundaries of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions is a question that applies to all four uses of democracy. The boundary question raises three distinct issues. The first is the extent of inclusion required among the members of the unit. The second is if membership in the unit is necessary for inclusion or if people that are not recognized as members are on certain conditions also entitled to participate. The third and final issue concerns the boundaries of the unit itself.

The lesson learned from COVID-19 and the climate crisis is not to let experts decide on policies: a response to Robert C. Schmidt

This is a response to the commentary by Robert C. Schmidt in this journal, in which the author suggests that for specific problems such as climate change or the current pandemic, decisions on policies should be made by scientific experts rather than by politicians. We argue that such ideas, which were brought up in the late 1960s and reconsidered more recently, do not take sufficient account of the nature of science politics, and their interaction. Furthermore, problem structures and resulting challenges for science and politics are not similar, but essentially different between climate change and the pandemic. Therefore, different solutions to the problems are required. There is a need to improve politics’ reliable recourse to scientific evidence in many cases. Yet, giving scientific experts such a strong position in decision-making ignores that most decisions, even if based on the state of scientific evidence (if there is such an uncontroversial state of evidence), ultimately require genuinely political choices about trade-offs of interests and normative issues that neither can nor should be made by scientists. Therefore, putting Schmidt’s proposal into practice would not solve the existing problems but instead create new problems.

Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Specification

Philosophical debates over statistical evidence have long been framed and dominated by L. Jonathan Cohen's Paradox of the Gatecrasher and a related hypothetical example commonly called Prison Yard. These examples, however, raise an issue not discussed in the large and growing literature on statistical evidence – the question of what statistical evidence is supposed to be evidence of. In actual practice, the legal system does not start with a defendant and then attempt to determine if that defendant has committed some unspecified or under-specified act, as these examples appear to suppose. Rather, both criminal and civil litigation start with a sufficiently specified act and then attempt to determine if the defendant has committed it. And when we start with a more fully specified act, the statistics look very different, and these prominent examples no longer present the paradox they are claimed to support. Examining the issue of specification, however, does more than simply undercut the prominent examples in a long and extensive literature. The examination also raises normative issues challenging the legal system's traditional reluctance to base liability on the conjunction of probabilities.

Ethics

This chapter seeks to clarify some of the core ethical arguments surrounding welfare states. The analysis focuses on three key values. First, we will consider the concept of need. What are basic needs? How do we conceptualize and measure them? Do citizens have rights to what they need? Second, we focus on principles of equality and, third, we look at arguments surrounding the implications of the welfare state for liberty. A final section concludes by noting some normative issues moving increasingly to the forefront of debate. A changing global political context raises new issues about the international salience of these issues, questions which national welfare states have found it difficult to address.

Global bioethical challenges of medicalising psychedelics

Psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy is an emerging psychiatric treatment that is attracting significant scientific, medical, and public attention. Whilst preliminary results from empirical studies are promising, the medical use of these compounds is highly controversial. Surprisingly, and despite the current controversies caused by the re-medicalisation of psychedelics, bioethicists have remained mysteriously silent. This paper aims to stimulate further bioethical reflection regarding the re-medicalisation of psychedelics. The current paper aims to do this by applying a normative phenomenological lens of analysis. Namely, this paper applies Martin Heidegger's critique of modern technology, and Fredrik Svenaeus' extension of this critique, to the re-medicalisation of psychedelics. I argue that when this critique of modern technology is applied several normative issues become apparent. Specifically, it becomes apparent that the re-medicalisation of psychedelics risks turning the ecological sources, cultural contexts, and experiences induced by psychedelics into resources to be exploited for human goals; all of which risks endangering ecosystems, appropriating traditional knowledge, and reducing the therapeutic effects of psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy. Furthermore, I suggest that preserving non-reductionist, non-instrumentalising traditional ways of understanding psychedelic compounds is essential in mitigating these consequences. More discussion by bioethicists is necessary as these consequences represent important global challenges for the psychedelic renaissance that require immediate addressing.

Benchmarking corporate water reporting in emerging economies: the case of Peru

Purpose This paper aims to develop a framework to examine corporate water reporting (CWR) that considers the context in emerging economies and determine if and how companies are addressing the distinct water-related challenges and opportunities that they face in any given location. Design/methodology/approach This study combines a concise profile of the context of water resources management in Peru with a review of CWR guidelines and thematic content analysis of water information in sustainability reports for 34 companies operating in Peru. These data are then used to inform the development of a CWR typology via the use of a cluster analysis complemented by within-case and cross-case qualitative analysis of companies. Findings This study highlights the incomplete nature of most CWR practices of companies in Peru, with an emphasis on internal firm operations. Where companies do provide information on water risk and stakeholder engagement, there is insufficient detail to provide a clear picture of contributions to sustainable water management at the local level. The main drivers for CWR in Peru appear to be pressure from international markets, regulation and other normative issues. Practical implications The findings indicate that companies need to place more emphasis on the local context when reporting on water risks and activities, which could be achieved through the use of CWR frameworks that integrate both international and sectoral CWR guidelines, along with indicators related to good water governance, water, sanitation and hygiene service delivery and the sustainable development goals, as together they provide a more comprehensive reflection of the broader challenges and opportunities related to corporate water management. Originality/value This paper presents the first framework specifically developed to evaluate CWR practices with consideration of the context of an emerging economy.

Philosophical Foundations of Climate Change Policy

Although the task of formulating an appropriate policy response to the problem of anthropogenic climate change is one that raises a number of very difficult normative issues, environmental ethicists have not played an influential role in government deliberations. This is primarily due to their rejection of many of the assumptions that structure the debates over policy. This book offers a philosophical defense of these assumptions in order to overcome the major conceptual barriers to the participation of philosophers in these debates. There are five important barriers: First, the policy debate presupposes a stance of liberal neutrality, as a result of which it does not privilege any particular set of environmental values over other concerns. Second, it assumes ongoing economic growth, along with a commitment to what is sometimes called a weak sustainability framework when analyzing the value of the bequest being made to future generations. Third, it treats climate change as fundamentally a collective action problem, not an issue of distributive justice. Fourth, there is the acceptance of cost-benefit analysis, or more precisely, the view that a carbon-pricing regime should be guided by our best estimate of the social cost of carbon. And finally, there is the view that when this calculation is undertaken, it is permissible to discount costs and benefits, depending on how far removed they are from the present. This book attempts to make explicit and defend these presuppositions, and in so doing offer philosophical foundations for the debate over climate change policy.

Co-design and ethical artificial intelligence for health: An agenda for critical research and practice

Applications of artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) in health care are dynamic and rapidly growing. One strategy for anticipating and addressing ethical challenges related to AI/ML for health care is patient and public involvement in the design of those technologies – often referred to as ‘co-design’. Co-design has a diverse intellectual and practical history, however, and has been conceptualized in many different ways. Moreover, AI/ML introduces challenges to co-design that are often underappreciated. Informed by perspectives from critical data studies and critical digital health studies, we review the research literature on involvement in health care, and involvement in design, and examine the extent to which co-design as commonly conceptualized is capable of addressing the range of normative issues raised by AI/ML for health care. We suggest that AI/ML technologies have amplified and modified existing challenges related to patient and public involvement, and created entirely new challenges. We outline three pitfalls associated with co-design for ethical AI/ML for health care and conclude with suggestions for addressing these practical and conceptual challenges.

Vulnerability, Space, Communication: Three Conditions of Adequacy for Cosmopolitan Right

The chapter argues that according to the Kantian completeness assumption, not only do we face a major unresolved systematic issue—all exercise of cosmopolitan right takes place in a state of nature between states and foreigners: a highly structured state of nature, to be sure, but a state of nature nonetheless—but we have too few options for fulfilling the conditions of explanatory adequacy. Niesen points out that in Kant and the Law of War no space is reserved for leaving normative issues undecided, to be resolved through politics and through additional, positive global institutions.