Outcome and Other Luck

2021 ◽  
pp. 326-347
Author(s):  
A P Simester
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Outcome Luck ◽  
Criminal Culpability ◽  
In Virtue Of

This chapter argues that the consequence elements of any crime form a constitutive part of the criminal wrong, in virtue of which criminal culpability is sensitive to outcome luck. Outcomes change what one is culpable for, and they rightly affect what one is convicted of. Yet it does not follow that they alter the degree of one’s culpability, or the quantum of punishment that one deserves. The dependence of outcomes on luck is compatible with moral responsibility, and indeed culpability, for such outcomes. However, because outcome luck occurs after the defendant behaves as she does, it cannot change the manner in which that behaviour reflects a moral vice on the defendant’s part. The chapter also considers challenges posed by other forms of luck. Characteristically, both the criminal law and ordinary blaming judgements accommodate circumstantial luck by means of justifications and excuses; not by irresponsibility defences. In so doing, they disavow the thought that circumstantial luck, too, can undermine moral responsibility.

Reason and Dreaming in Republic IX and the Timaeus

Rhizomata ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Karel Thein
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Actual Process ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract The article discusses two passages, Republic IX 571d6–572b1, and Timaeus 71a3–72b5, where Plato does not use dream as a metaphor for the soul’s deficit in knowledge but, instead, focuses on the actual process of dreaming during sleep, and the origin and nature of the images involved. In both texts, Plato’s account is closely connected to the soul’s tripartition, with the resulting emphasis on reason’s capacity to control, and even to create, the dream images that influence the lower parts of the soul. While taking a closer look at the differences between the two accounts (and, therefore, at the physiology of dreaming described only in the Timaeus), the article concludes that, despite these differences, both dialogues agree on the possible alliance between reason and dreaming, an alliance that presupposes a virtuous character and further reinforces the reason’s dominance over appetite. Republic IX and the Timaeus thus converge on the idea that dreams, in virtue of their continuity with waking thoughts, can convey and fortify a certain kind of knowledge, and especially self-knowledge, which is of an ethical rather than strictly epistemic relevance. This is also why Plato’s two accounts of rational dreaming anticipate the issue of our moral responsibility for the content of our dreams.

Moral and Ascriptive Responsibilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
A P Simester
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Moral Praise ◽  
Act Requirement

This chapter sets out in more detail two concepts of responsibility, “moral” and “ascriptive”, as they are used in this book. Moral responsibility is concerned with a defendant’s eligibility for moral praise or blame in respect of her behaviour. Ascriptive responsibility, by contrast is concerned with the conditions of accountability. The latter is audience-relative: the former is not. Within the criminal law, denials of moral responsibility are accommodated through defences such as infancy and insanity, and by the requirement of voluntariness. Denials of ascription, by contrast, turn primarily upon doctrines of causation, omissions, and complicity. The chapter concludes with a critique of the so-called voluntary act requirement.

What Is Criminal Culpability?

2019 ◽  
pp. 27-82
Author(s):  
Alexander Sarch
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Criminal Culpability

Chapter 2 aims to elucidate the concept of criminal culpability. Since the project of the book is to analyze, evaluate, and ultimately defend certain criminal law doctrines that impute mental states on the basis of equal culpability, the chapter explains what criminal culpability is. Chapter 2 presents the author’s theory of culpability and aims to show why it offers an attractive way to think about this concept. The theory falls squarely within the insufficient regard tradition, but the chapter fleshes out details in new ways to strengthen the theory and solve certain problems for this sort of position. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first is ecumenical and aims to bring as many into the broad church of the insufficient regard theory as possible. The chapter does this by highlighting the explanatory power of the author’s version of the theory (particularly the requirement to manifest bad attitudes in action before criminal liability attaches and the criminal law’s general disinterest in motives and other unmanifested mental states). The chapter also shows how the theory can accommodate both sides in certain controversies about the criminal law. The second half of the chapter adopts a normative stance and provides arguments for how these controversies should be resolved. This insufficient regard theory is used as the basis for the arguments going forward in the book.

The Limits of Criminal Culpability

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-175
Author(s):  
Mark Thornton
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Core Concept ◽  
The Core ◽  
Criminal Culpability ◽  
Subjectivist Theory

The authors of Crime and Culpability hold a subjectivist theory of criminal culpability according to which the core concept in culpability is subjective recklessness, negligence is not culpable, and it is irrelevant to culpability whether or not a criminal act results in harm. I argue against these three theses and criticize the authors’ views on the structure of criminal law, criminal defences, criminal attempts, and codification.

Moral Responsibility and Voluntariness

2021 ◽  
pp. 185-208
Author(s):  
A P Simester
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
Ways Of Thinking ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores some of the ways in which moral responsibility for events can be negated through a lack of voluntariness. It looks at how such negations are best accommodated within the criminal law. The chapter begins by identifying two ways of thinking about voluntariness. Some writers see voluntariness as a counterpart to involuntariness, envisaging behaviour ‘done in the presence of open alternatives’. Others explain voluntary behaviour in terms of ‘volitional’ behaviour that is intentional under some description; behaviour, one might say, done willingly. The chapter goes on to consider the relationship between voluntariness and the varieties of actus reus elements, including omissions, situational liability, and possession.

Practical reasoning and intentional action

Legal Studies ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Tadros
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Harmful Consequence

In the criminal law it is common to distinguish between motive and intention. One of the main reasons for so doing is that in criminal law we are concerned with the wrongfulness of an action in itself and not the agent's own moral evaluation of that action. For this reason, intention has become central to assessing criminal liability. But a similar problem arises with regard to the term intention. This is because whether or not an agent intends a particular consequence depends upon whether or not it was one of the reasons (that is, explanatory reasons) for which she acted. However, we ought to be interested in the reasons that actually applied to those actions (guiding reasons). Hence, the concept of oblique intention applies where the agent realised that a harmful consequence of her action was virtually certain even though it was not a reason for her action. Some writers suggest that this problem can be solved by including consequences brought about intentionally as well as intended consequences within the concept of intention. And this, they argue, is because the use of the adverb is (either conceptually or causally) related to our moral evaluation of an action. In this essay I show that this is not so. The concept of intention is wholly descriptive. Consequently, we require a suitable supplement or alternative to the concept of intention to reflect the highest degree of moral responsibility for the harmful consequences of our actions.

A Riddle Regarding Omissions

1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
John Martin Fischer ◽  
Responsibility Attributions ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
In Virtue Of

John Martin Fischer has recently proposed that actions and omissions are asymmetric with respect to the requirement of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility: whereas moral responsibility for an action does not require freedom to refrain from performing the action, moral responsibility for failure to perform an action does require freedom to perform the action. In what follows, I first critically assess Fischer's asymmetry principle. In arguing against the principle, I raise some concerns about Fischer's association of responsibility with control. I then motivate a riddle regarding omissions: some cases appear to show that a person is not responsible for failing to bring about something in virtue of the fact that the person could not bring about that thing. Other cases, though, seemingly show that a person is responsible for failing to bring about something even though the person could not bring about that thing. What explains the asymmetry in responsibility attributions in these cases involving omissions? Third, I consider some answers to this riddle and explain why they are inadequate. Finally, I sketch my own answer.

An exploration of the semantic domain of legal language

Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Pi-Chan Hu ◽  
Jian Li
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Legal Language ◽  
Legal Professionals ◽  
Semantic Domain ◽  
Criminal Culpability

AbstractWhenever necessary, legal professionals expand or restrict the semantic domain of legal terms to justify their reasoning or ruling. The semantic domain expands or contracts in size depending on the different approaches towards interpretations adopted by legal professionals. This research illustrates the interpretations of judges and prosecutors of legal terms with empirical cases and court opinions. In the field of Criminal Law, the semantic domain often leads to the domain of criminal culpability and punishment. The shift in the semantic domain of legal terms matters a great deal to all of the stakeholders in a case. When the domain grows too broad, it will criminalize citizens beyond the intention of the Legislature. When the domain shrinks too much, the victims will not receive justice. Therefore, legal professionals have to be exceedingly modest and cautious when playing their roles as law interpreters.

Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Funkhouser
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Principle Of Alternate Possibilities ◽  
Causal Preemption ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

For nearly forty years now, Frankfurt cases have served as one of the major contributors to the compatibilist's cause with respect to moral responsibility. These cases typically involve a causally preempted condition that is supposed to guarantee a choice without causing it. This has had the effect of softening up some to the idea that determinism does not exclude moral responsibility simply in virtue of guaranteeing a unique future. I believe that these traditional Frankfurt cases adequately support this cause. But I also believe that the traditional versions of Frankfurt cases suffer from some rhetorical defects.My strategy is as follows. First, I want to respond to a dilemma that has been raised by some libertarians against arguments utilizing Frankfurt cases. This dilemma has the effect of raising a question-begging charge against such arguments. Part of my response is to draw attention to the relevant principle that I think Frankfurt cases should really target, a principle slightly different from Harry Frankfurt's original Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Second, I elaborate and defend the claim that traditional Frankfurt cases involve causal preemption.

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