Narrative Politics: Stories and Collective Action By Frederick W. Mayer Oxford University Press. 2014. 192 pp. $49.95 hardcover

Social Forces ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. e25-e25
Author(s):  
Katherine K. Chen
2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (128) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingreet Juliet Cano Castellanos

David Mosse, The rule of water. Statecraft, ecology and collective action in South India, Nueva Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2003, 337 p.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-156
Author(s):  
Kerry Whiteside

Public goods, as economists use the term, are “nonrival” (one person's consumption does not make it unavailable for others) and, typically, “nonexcludable” (if the good is provided to one person, others cannot be prevented from enjoying it as well). The classic example is the lighthouse, whose warning light goes out to and benefits all ships. Economists devote special attention to public goods because markets do not deliver them efficiently. Rational, self-interested actors realize that if anyone else provides this good, they can have it without paying for it. The incentives favor “free riding.” Others, however, see the same opportunity and so public goods go underprovided. There is thus a strong case for collective action to furnish public goods. Where collective benefits outweigh the costs of provision, government action can make society as a whole better-off.


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