The Elusive Nature of Shareholders’ Claims Over the Corporation, or the Strange Non-death of Shareholder Primacy

2022 ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Olivier Butzbach
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Simon Deakin

The debate over corporate governance is skewed by the common misunderstanding that shareholders are the owners of companies, and are entitled to have them run in their interest. The legal model of the firm is more nuanced, seeing the corporation as a complex entity characterized by co-operation between the suppliers of capital and labour, with a co-ordinating role for management. The elevation of shareholder primacy as a focal point for corporate strategy over recent decades is the result of government deferring to financial interests in the making of rules governing takeovers and board structure. Reversing financialization, and the negative impact it is having on social cohesion and innovation, will require a new legislative framework for corporate governance, with a greater role for employee voice and a reorientation of investment priorities.


2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Armour ◽  
Simon Deakin ◽  
Suzanne J. Konzelmann

2021 ◽  
pp. 103-132
Author(s):  
Iñigo Zavala Ortiz de la Torre

Existe una pugna entre los defensores de que los accionistas sean la referencia, a la que la dirección de la empresa tiene que mirar cuando adopta sus decisiones; frente a los que creen que, junto a estos se deben tomar en cuenta los intereses de otros stakeholders como son los trabajadores, los acreedores, los proveedores y los clientes. Si bien la doctrina, e incluso las posibilidades legislativas, avalan la segunda postura en los países anglosajones; tanto la práctica, como el análisis de los principales Códigos de Buen Gobierno, nos muestran que en realidad sigue vigente la primera. ¿Porqué? Recibido: 14 enero 2013Aceptado: 18 febrero 2013


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