The Principle of Shareholder Primacy in Company Law from a Nordic and European Regulatory Perspective

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Krüger Andersen ◽  
Evelyne J.B. Sørensen
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 301-331
Author(s):  
Saša Prelič ◽  
Antonija Zubović

<span>The article analyzes leveraged buyout transactions, pointing out to the open issues in their application. Authors highlight the application of provisions concerning group of companies as well as mergers and acquisitions in LBO transactions. Furthermore, since business practice has shown that LBOs are often used in takeovers, authors analyze the application of LBOs in takeover procedures. In addition, the article analyzes the European regulatory framework for the regulation of LBOs and compares the adopted solutions in Croatian, Slovenian and Italian law. Comparing the solutions of these three legislations, authors conclude that there are significant differences between them. While Croatia and Italy adopted the provisions of Second Company Law Directive, Slovenian legislator significantly tightened the conditions for using LBOs and de facto precluded their application. In conclusion, authors evaluate the consequences of the adopted provisions and looks for appropriate solutions de lege ferenda.</span>


2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 235-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chrispas Nyombi

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical. Findings – The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule. Originality/value – The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers.


Diabetologia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Blind ◽  
K. Dunder ◽  
P. A. de Graeff ◽  
E. Abadie

2003 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 185-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibault Verbiest ◽  
Ewout Keuleers

Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Johnston ◽  
Blanche Segrestin ◽  
Armand Hatchuel

AbstractWe show that professional management began to emerge in UK companies during the first half of the twentieth century, a development which was widely theorised and accepted. However, the managerially-led enterprise was accommodated rather than protected by company law, making it vulnerable to changes in the law. The Cohen Report of 1945 paid no attention to these developments, and led to the introduction, in the Companies Act 1948, of important, but previously little appreciated, changes in the name of enhancing the accountability of directors to shareholders. The shareholders’ statutory right to remove the directors by simple majority overturned existing structures overnight and was an important driver of the hostile takeover, which emerged shortly afterwards. This deprived management of the necessary autonomy to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise and to foster innovation. The emergence of the current system of shareholder primacy can be traced back to these developments.


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