Shareholder primacy, labour and the historic ambivalence of UK company law

Author(s):  
Marc T. Moore
2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 235-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chrispas Nyombi

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical. Findings – The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule. Originality/value – The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers.


Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Johnston ◽  
Blanche Segrestin ◽  
Armand Hatchuel

AbstractWe show that professional management began to emerge in UK companies during the first half of the twentieth century, a development which was widely theorised and accepted. However, the managerially-led enterprise was accommodated rather than protected by company law, making it vulnerable to changes in the law. The Cohen Report of 1945 paid no attention to these developments, and led to the introduction, in the Companies Act 1948, of important, but previously little appreciated, changes in the name of enhancing the accountability of directors to shareholders. The shareholders’ statutory right to remove the directors by simple majority overturned existing structures overnight and was an important driver of the hostile takeover, which emerged shortly afterwards. This deprived management of the necessary autonomy to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise and to foster innovation. The emergence of the current system of shareholder primacy can be traced back to these developments.


Legal Studies ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorraine Talbot

This paper aims to unravel two connected errors in the current critical position on companies. Since the financial crisis, there have been a growing number of voices in the academic community raised against the shareholder value driven corporate sector. The often conservative and highly doctrinal voices of English company lawyers have become in parts more radicalised and have found common research ground with varied academic disciplines and with company lawyers in other jurisdictions more accustomed to critical approaches. New ideas have been forged; old ideas have been rediscovered and re-examined. In the emerging networks, the neoliberal domination of the study of companies is being substantially challenged. As exciting as this is, I am concerned that critical scholars have cohered around a core claim about company law which is erroneous. Furthermore, they have largely assumed that the current economy can sustain a social agenda as well as creating profit. This, I argue, hugely underestimates entrenched problems in the economy. In unravelling these issues my aim is to reorientate challenges to shareholder primacy and to the claims of capital more generally.


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