Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the regional effects of expansion can be managed under the constraints of voluntary cooperation. This paper studies international cooperation on electricity transmission expansions in a region of countries that shares a joint electricity infrastructure.
Design/methodology/approach
– Cooperative game theory and the partition-function form were applied in combination with benefit–cost ratios to model and analyse the incentives to cooperate under different cost allocation rules. Empirical background was provided by a case study of a transmission investment agreement made on the Nordic electricity market.
Findings
– Both cost sharing and the composition of expansion plans were identified as ways of reaching regional agreements. It was found that agreements based on proportional division of costs in relation to benefits were the best choice for voluntary cooperation.
Research limitations/implications
– The study did not analyse the effects or relevance of surplus sharing in addition to that implied by cost sharing, nor has it studied the regulatory and legal requirements for implementing side-payments between countries in grid expansions. These issues could benefit from more study.
Practical implications
– The results are relevant for the development of international cooperation on grid expansions and as an input to regulations and policies aimed at promoting regional perspectives, in particular for the case of a single internal energy market in Europe.
Originality/value
– The paper contributes with an analysis of incentives for transmission expansions in a multinational environment subject to voluntary provision and a lack of supranational authorities with decision power.
A novel multiobjective generation and transmission investment framework for implementing 100% renewable energy sources
