Study on designated verifier proxy signature schemes with provable security

Author(s):  
Xiaoming Hu ◽  
Yinchun Yang ◽  
Xiaojun Zhang ◽  
Huajie Xu ◽  
Jian Wang
2013 ◽  
Vol 411-414 ◽  
pp. 721-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bao Dian Wei

Most of the existing ID-based designated verifier proxy signature schemes are implemented with pairings. The computation of parings is still much more expensive than the common modular multiplications and exponentiations. To obtain better efficiency, we construct an efficient ID-based DVPS scheme without pairings. The scheme is designed based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problems. It is proven secure against adaptively chosen message attacks, in the random oracle model.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baoyuan Kang

In a designated verifier proxy signature scheme, there are three participants, namely, the original signer, the proxy signer, and the designated verifier. The original signer delegates his or her signing right to the proxy signer, then the proxy signer can generate valid signature on behalf of the original signer. But only the designated verifier can verify the proxy signature. Several designated verifier proxy signature schemes have been proposed. However, most of them were proven secure in the random oracle model, which has received a lot of criticism since the security proofs in the random oracle model are not sound with respect to the standard model. Recently, by employing Water's hashing technique, Yu et al. proposed a new construction of designated verifier proxy signature. They claimed that the new construction is the first designated verifier proxy signature, whose security does not rely on the random oracles. But, in this paper, we will show some attacks on Yu et al.'s scheme. So, their scheme is not secure.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (24) ◽  
pp. 2050197
Author(s):  
Xiangjun Xin ◽  
Qinglan Yang ◽  
Fagen Li

A quantum proxy signature scheme makes the proxy signer can generate a quantum signature on behalf of the original signer. Although many quantum proxy signature schemes have been proposed, none of them can be formally proved to be secure. There is not even security model for the quantum proxy signatures. Some quantum proxy signature schemes have been proved to be insecure against forgery attacks. In this paper, first, the formal definition and the corresponding security model for the quantum proxy signatures are proposed. Second, based on the Hadamard operator and the controlled NOT operation, a new quantum proxy signature scheme is proposed. The security of our quantum proxy signature scheme can be formally proved under security model. The security model of the quantum proxy signatures is helpful for analyzing and improving the security of the quantum proxy signature schemes. On the other hand, compared with the other quantum proxy signatures, the new one proposed in this paper is the first that can be formally proved to be secure under security model.


2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Boldyreva ◽  
Adriana Palacio ◽  
Bogdan Warinschi

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