Deep Learning Side-Channel Attack Against Hardware Implementations of AES

Author(s):  
Takaya Kubota ◽  
Kota Yoshida ◽  
Mitsuru Shiozaki ◽  
Takeshi Fujino
2020 ◽  
pp. 103383
Author(s):  
Takaya Kubota ◽  
Kota Yoshida ◽  
Mitsuru Shiozaki ◽  
Takeshi Fujino

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 22480-22492
Author(s):  
Yoo-Seung Won ◽  
Dong-Guk Han ◽  
Dirmanto Jap ◽  
Shivam Bhasin ◽  
Jong-Yeon Park

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Mohamad Ali Mehrabi ◽  
Naila Mukhtar ◽  
Alireza Jolfaei

Many Internet of Things applications in smart cities use elliptic-curve cryptosystems due to their efficiency compared to other well-known public-key cryptosystems such as RSA. One of the important components of an elliptic-curve-based cryptosystem is the elliptic-curve point multiplication which has been shown to be vulnerable to various types of side-channel attacks. Recently, substantial progress has been made in applying deep learning to side-channel attacks. Conceptually, the idea is to monitor a core while it is running encryption for information leakage of a certain kind, for example, power consumption. The knowledge of the underlying encryption algorithm can be used to train a model to recognise the key used for encryption. The model is then applied to traces gathered from the crypto core in order to recover the encryption key. In this article, we propose an RNS GLV elliptic curve cryptography core which is immune to machine learning and deep learning based side-channel attacks. The experimental analysis confirms the proposed crypto core does not leak any information about the private key and therefore it is suitable for hardware implementations.


Author(s):  
V S Adhin ◽  
Arunjo Maliekkal ◽  
K Mukilan ◽  
K Sanjay ◽  
R Chitra ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Libang Zhang ◽  
Xinpeng Xing ◽  
Junfeng Fan ◽  
Zongyue Wang ◽  
Suying Wang

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