Design of Testability Structures With Security For Machine Intelligence Based Cryptosystem

During testing utmost all appropriate and suitable strategy needs to be established for consistent fault coverage, improved controllability and observability. The scan chains used in BIST allows some fine control over data propagations that is used as a backdoor to break the security over cryptographic cores. To alleviate these scan-based side-channel attacks, implementing a more inclusive security strategy is required to confuse the attacker and to ensure the key management process which is always a difficult task to task in cryptographic research. In this work for testing AES core Design-for-Testability (DfT) is considered with some random response compaction, bit masking during the scan process. In the proposed scan architecture, scan-based attack does not allow finding out actual computations which are related to the cipher transformations and key sequence. And observing the data through the scan structure is secured. The experimental results validate the potential metrics of the proposed scan model in terms of robustness to the scan attack and penalty gap that exists due to the inclusion of scan designs in AES core. Also investigate the selection of appropriate location points to implement the bit level modification to avoid attack for retrieving a key.

CacheHawkeye: Detecting Cache Side Channel Attacks Based on Memory Events

Cache side channel attacks, as a type of cryptanalysis, seriously threaten the security of the cryptosystem. These attacks continuously monitor the memory addresses associated with the victim’s secret information, which cause frequent memory access on these addresses. This paper proposes CacheHawkeye, which uses the frequent memory access characteristic of the attacker to detect attacks. CacheHawkeye monitors memory events by CPU hardware performance counters. We proved the effectiveness of CacheHawkeye on Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks. In addition, we evaluated the accuracy of CacheHawkeye under different system loads. Experiments demonstrate that CacheHawkeye not only has good accuracy but can also adapt to various system loads.

A Virtual Machine Migration Strategy Based on the Relevance of Services against Side-Channel Attacks

With the rapid development of Internet of Things technology, a large amount of user information needs to be uploaded to the cloud server for computing and storage. Side-channel attacks steal the private information of other virtual machines by coresident virtual machines to bring huge security threats to edge computing. Virtual machine migration technology is currently the main way to defend against side-channel attacks. VM migration can effectively prevent attackers from realizing coresident virtual machines, thereby ensuring data security and privacy protection of edge computing based on the Internet of Things. This paper considers the relevance between application services and proposes a VM migration strategy based on service correlation. This strategy defines service relevance factors to quantify the degree of service relevance, build VM migration groups through service relevance factors, and effectively reduce communication overhead between servers during migration, design and implement the VM memory migration based on the post-copy method, effectively reduce the occurrence of page fault interruption, and improve the efficiency of VM migration.